Yes, that is how your decision gives your measure M to world WA or to world WB, but that shouldn’t affect accumulation of measure into later states of these worlds by quantum fluctuation, so both worlds still get measure 10M from that.

Unless you mean that quantum fluctuations into later states of the world are directed by the normal evolution of the earlier states, including your decision, in which case, this process would be adding measure (perhaps not quantum measure, but counting as decision theoretic measure in the same way) to the initial state of the world in which you make the decision (because it is another instance of the same causal chain, that is, it produces the same result for the same reasons), so you get all 10M of the quantum fluctuation measure right away, and choice A gives 44M utilons while B still gives 33M utilons.

My model was of gradual proportional increase in utility

Yes, my example shows a proportional increase in measure between two times, and is indifferent to the gradual increase between these times. If you think the gradual increase is important, please provide an example that illustrates this.

not absolute addition to every branch.

I have already explained why adding the measure to a single branch is incoherent in both the cases where the decision causes or does not cause selection of the branch that receives the measure.

I have already explained why adding the measure to a single branch is incoherent in both the cases where the decision causes or does not cause selection of the branch that receives the measure.

I don’t quite understand the point. I’m claiming that, for instance, if a branch has measure M at time 0, it will have measure 2M at time 1. i.e. it’s measure at time 1 is twice that at time 0. If measure splits into N+N’=M, then the branch with N will go to 2N and that with N’ will go to 2N’.

Are you claiming that a) this model is incoherent, or b) that this model does not entail what I’m claiming (that you should save for the future)?

Are you claiming that a) this model is incoherent, or b) that this model does not entail what I’m claiming (that you should save for the future)?

The basic model you described, even as alternative physics, is underspecified, and depending on how I try to steelman it so it is coherent, it doesn’t entail what you claim, and if I try to steelman it so it entails what you say, it isn’t coherent.

The big question is what worlds get to accumulate measure and why those particular worlds. If the answer is that all worlds accumulate measure, then the accumulation happens independently of your decision, so the effect should not impact your decision. If the answer is that the measure accumulation process looks somehow depends on what world your decision leads to, then the measure accumulation process in locating that world duplicates its causal structure, and by the globalized anti zombie principle, contains all the same conscious people as that world, so it adds to the worlds decision theoretical measure even before your model says it officially adds to its quantum measure (this is basically parallel to the argument for Many Worlds). What I think is incoherent is the idea that you can add measure to world state without adding measure to the process that selected that world state, which you try to do by supposing that your decision (and its intermediate effects) don’t cause the later accumulation of measure, yet the measure magically accumulates in the world that results from your decision. (To account for this, you would have to follow the probability to outside the thought experiment.)

It feels like this should all be obvious if you understand why p-zombies are incoherent, why Many Worlds is obviously correct, and how these are related.

Consider this setup: you decide whether to buy ice cream now or chocolate later (chocolate ice cream unfortunately not being an option). Your mind will go through various considerations and analyses, and will arrive at a definite conclusion.

However, it’s actually determined what your decision is—any Laplacian demon could deduce it from looking at your brain. It’s all pretty clear, and quantum events are not enough to derail it (barring very very low measure stochastic events). So from the universe’s perspective, you’re not choosing anything, not shifting measure from anything to anything.

But you can’t know your own decision before making it. So you have the impression of free will, and are using an appropriate decision theory. Most of these work “as if” your own decision determines which (logical) world will exist, and hence which world will get the increased measure. Or, if your prefer, you know that the world you decide on will get increased measure in the future, you are simply in ignorance of which one it will be. So you have to balance “ice cream before the increased measure” with “chocolate after the increased measure”, even though you know one of these is impossible.

However, it’s actually determined what your decision is—any Laplacian demon could deduce it from looking at your brain. It’s all pretty clear, and quantum events are not enough to derail it (barring very very low measure stochastic events). So from the universe’s perspective, you’re not choosing anything, not shifting measure from anything to anything.

The logical structure of my decision still controls what world gets the measure. From Timeless Control:

Surely, if you can determine the Future just by looking at the Past, there’s no need to look at the Present?

The problem with the right-side graph is twofold: First, it violates the beautiful locality of reality; we’re supposing causal relations that go outside the immediate neighborhoods of space/time/configuration. And second, you can’t compute the Future from the Past, except by also computing something that looks exactly like the Present; which computation just creates another copy of the Block Universe (if that statement even makes any sense), it does not affect any of the causal relations within it.

This is basically the same point as the one I keep making and you keep missing: The universe/Laplacian demon/whatever is adding quantum measure, in order to select the same world to add measure to that was selected by your decision, it has to duplicate the causal structure of your decision and the resulting world. (And since within this computation the same things happen for the same reasons as in the selected world, by the generalized anti zombie principle, the computation is adding measure to that world even at times before your model says it adds quantum measure.)

The universe/Laplacian demon/whatever is adding quantum measure, in order to select the same world to add measure to that was selected by your decision,

The demon is not adding quantum measure, or selecting anything. Every Everett branch is getting its measure multiplied—nobody’s choice determines where the measure goes.

At least, from the outside perspective, for someone who knows what everyone else’s choices are/will be (and whose own choices are not relevant), nobody’s choice is determining where the measure goes. From the insider perspective, for someone who doesn’t know their own decision—well, that depends on their decision theory, and how they treat measure.

Yes, that is how your decision gives your measure M to world WA or to world WB, but that shouldn’t affect accumulation of measure into later states of these worlds by quantum fluctuation, so both worlds still get measure 10M from that.

Unless you mean that quantum fluctuations into later states of the world are directed by the normal evolution of the earlier states, including your decision, in which case, this process would be adding measure (perhaps not quantum measure, but counting as decision theoretic measure in the same way) to the initial state of the world in which you make the decision (because it is another instance of the same causal chain, that is, it produces the same result for the same reasons), so you get all 10M of the quantum fluctuation measure right away, and choice A gives 44M utilons while B still gives 33M utilons.

My model was of gradual proportional increase in utility, not absolute addition to every branch.

Yes, my example shows a proportional increase in measure between two times, and is indifferent to the gradual increase between these times. If you think the gradual increase is important, please provide an example that illustrates this.

I have already explained why adding the measure to a single branch is incoherent in both the cases where the decision causes or does not cause selection of the branch that receives the measure.

I don’t quite understand the point. I’m claiming that, for instance, if a branch has measure M at time 0, it will have measure 2M at time 1. i.e. it’s measure at time 1 is twice that at time 0. If measure splits into N+N’=M, then the branch with N will go to 2N and that with N’ will go to 2N’.

Are you claiming that a) this model is incoherent, or b) that this model does not entail what I’m claiming (that you should save for the future)?

The basic model you described, even as alternative physics, is underspecified, and depending on how I try to steelman it so it is coherent, it doesn’t entail what you claim, and if I try to steelman it so it entails what you say, it isn’t coherent.

The big question is what worlds get to accumulate measure and why those particular worlds. If the answer is that all worlds accumulate measure, then the accumulation happens independently of your decision, so the effect should not impact your decision. If the answer is that the measure accumulation process looks somehow depends on what world your decision leads to, then the measure accumulation process in locating that world duplicates its causal structure, and by the globalized anti zombie principle, contains all the same conscious people as that world, so it adds to the worlds decision theoretical measure even before your model says it officially adds to its quantum measure (this is basically parallel to the argument for Many Worlds). What I think is incoherent is the idea that you can add measure to world state without adding measure to the process that selected that world state, which you try to do by supposing that your decision (and its intermediate effects) don’t cause the later accumulation of measure, yet the measure magically accumulates in the world that results from your decision. (To account for this, you would have to follow the probability to outside the thought experiment.)

It feels like this should all be obvious if you understand why p-zombies are incoherent, why Many Worlds is obviously correct, and how these are related.

Consider this setup: you decide whether to buy ice cream now or chocolate later (chocolate ice cream unfortunately not being an option). Your mind will go through various considerations and analyses, and will arrive at a definite conclusion.

However, it’s actually determined what your decision is—any Laplacian demon could deduce it from looking at your brain. It’s all pretty clear, and quantum events are not enough to derail it (barring very very low measure stochastic events). So from the universe’s perspective, you’re not choosing anything, not shifting measure from anything to anything.

But you can’t know your own decision before making it. So you have the impression of free will, and are using an appropriate decision theory. Most of these work “as if” your own decision determines which (logical) world will exist, and hence which world will get the increased measure. Or, if your prefer, you know that the world you decide on will get increased measure in the future, you are simply in ignorance of which one it will be. So you have to balance “ice cream before the increased measure” with “chocolate after the increased measure”, even though you know one of these is impossible.

The logical structure of my decision still controls what world gets the measure. From Timeless Control:

This is basically the same point as the one I keep making and you keep missing: The universe/Laplacian demon/whatever is adding quantum measure, in order to select the same world to add measure to that was selected by your decision, it has to duplicate the causal structure of your decision and the resulting world. (And since within this computation the same things happen for the same reasons as in the selected world, by the generalized anti zombie principle, the computation is adding measure to that world even at times before your model says it adds quantum measure.)

The demon is not adding quantum measure, or selecting anything. Every Everett branch is getting its measure multiplied—nobody’s choice determines where the measure goes.

At least, from the outside perspective, for someone who knows what everyone else’s choices are/will be (and whose own choices are not relevant), nobody’s choice is determining where the measure goes. From the insider perspective, for someone who doesn’t know their own decision—well, that depends on their decision theory, and how they treat measure.

Do you also disagree with , http://lesswrong.com/lw/g9n/false_vacuum_the_universe_playing_quantum_suicide/ btw? Because that’s simply the same problem in reverse.