I, a year ago, was a slightly different person than I am now. Both past-me and current-me are me. You are essentially saying that me-who-died is the version that should go to heaven and all the previous versions should not. Why?
We can also reverse the issue—in a simulation, I don’t have to die. If I am hit by a bus, insert a one-minute delay somewhere and the simulated-I will continue to live. Should that longer-lived version go to heaven, then?
Historical consistency—an intervention like that quickly leads to a fictional world that is ranked low in the ress utility function (because people from that fictional world don’t go on to create the actual future resurrection).
In part but there are also can be regular causal trades between simulators within each world. For example a future simulation physically located in say china will necessarily be separate from located in canada. These simulators can trade in the more regular sense.
That goes to the issue of who is “you”.
I, a year ago, was a slightly different person than I am now. Both past-me and current-me are me. You are essentially saying that me-who-died is the version that should go to heaven and all the previous versions should not. Why?
We can also reverse the issue—in a simulation, I don’t have to die. If I am hit by a bus, insert a one-minute delay somewhere and the simulated-I will continue to live. Should that longer-lived version go to heaven, then?
Historical consistency—an intervention like that quickly leads to a fictional world that is ranked low in the ress utility function (because people from that fictional world don’t go on to create the actual future resurrection).
So is this whole “res utility function” based on obligations arising out of acausal trades?
In part but there are also can be regular causal trades between simulators within each world. For example a future simulation physically located in say china will necessarily be separate from located in canada. These simulators can trade in the more regular sense.