I don’t think selling or buying votes is a good solution. There is a reason why we have multiple forms of social institutions: they solve different types of problems using different types of tools. If you think the problems of governance and policy are solved via a market mechanism I think your first task is to show why the market solution never emerged in the first place. But I think if you want to go down that path why stop at votes, why not take David Friedman’s approach of a market anarchy where government largely doesn’t exist but private solutions provided in a competitive market setting do.
Well, I am a minimalist when it comes to government. But regardless of whether or not it’s government, there is a variety of situations wherein group decisions have to be made. There are already many mechanisms around for such decisions. I’ve just suggested another one. As I’ve mentioned, it’s definitely not ideal for all situations. And one of my questions continues to be in what type of organization would this be most effective?
I’m happy to keep having the conversation about vote buying in politics. It’s an interesting academic exercise. However, there is no way in hell this ever gets implemented by a national government, so any such conversations are necessarily academic. What’s more interesting to me is real world organizations that could adopt such a mechanism.
While not quite buying votes elections in the Philippines, at least local elections, have near ubiquitous payments to potential voters by candidate—including forms with the name of the recipient (eligible voter) for each in a household (seems to help ensure that someone doesn’t front-run the payment and keep all payments when they can only cast one vote).
But when talking with people about the whole arrangement no one seems to think it actually changes results or makes anything better in terms or official or policy or effective governance. Just a small bit of extra cash candidates have to payout—and so will then want to recoup in terms of bribes or other forms of political corruption.
Not something I’ve made a study about so all anecdotal but seems to be a real world case that is similar to your thoughts. But also different in that each candidate is making a payment and no real enforcement mechanism to ensure the vote is given to the highest bidder (or whatever the buy structure might be).
I don’t think selling or buying votes is a good solution. There is a reason why we have multiple forms of social institutions: they solve different types of problems using different types of tools. If you think the problems of governance and policy are solved via a market mechanism I think your first task is to show why the market solution never emerged in the first place. But I think if you want to go down that path why stop at votes, why not take David Friedman’s approach of a market anarchy where government largely doesn’t exist but private solutions provided in a competitive market setting do.
Well, I am a minimalist when it comes to government. But regardless of whether or not it’s government, there is a variety of situations wherein group decisions have to be made. There are already many mechanisms around for such decisions. I’ve just suggested another one. As I’ve mentioned, it’s definitely not ideal for all situations. And one of my questions continues to be in what type of organization would this be most effective?
I’m happy to keep having the conversation about vote buying in politics. It’s an interesting academic exercise. However, there is no way in hell this ever gets implemented by a national government, so any such conversations are necessarily academic. What’s more interesting to me is real world organizations that could adopt such a mechanism.
While not quite buying votes elections in the Philippines, at least local elections, have near ubiquitous payments to potential voters by candidate—including forms with the name of the recipient (eligible voter) for each in a household (seems to help ensure that someone doesn’t front-run the payment and keep all payments when they can only cast one vote).
But when talking with people about the whole arrangement no one seems to think it actually changes results or makes anything better in terms or official or policy or effective governance. Just a small bit of extra cash candidates have to payout—and so will then want to recoup in terms of bribes or other forms of political corruption.
Not something I’ve made a study about so all anecdotal but seems to be a real world case that is similar to your thoughts. But also different in that each candidate is making a payment and no real enforcement mechanism to ensure the vote is given to the highest bidder (or whatever the buy structure might be).