The story involves a lot of “looking down” on people being ineffective because of confusion or out of underdevelopment. The is probably value in being aware of your value structure and not be in error about it but it also feels like that other agents might be categorised to be confused when they are just having a value structure that goes by different lines that you do.
Say that I care about wormless apples a lot and don’t like wormfull apples. I encounter a lot of picks between an apple and an orange. Say that every time the apple has a worm I pick orange. From the perspective of an outsider (which might not have similar worm-detection abilities) it can seem that 100 times out of 1000 I go for the orange instead of the apple. That outsider might then be tempted to think that I am not following a utility function but I am being confused or contradictory in regards to my fruit buying. But in my terms and perception I am. And even if I only had a unconcious ough-field around worms that I non-conceptually intuit are there would that unawareness of the function make me not follow that function?
So if persons whos values are imperceptually complex and fragile to me appear the same as confused persons going around judging everybody that doesn’t make sense in my terms that can make for trying to hammer people from unfamiliar shapes to familiar shapes which could be a form of xenophobia. I guess in Kelthams situation assuming that anybody different is lesser can make sense. And in the area of sexuality Keltham is not sure whether his world is strictly superior. But what about the areas where the comparison is not easy? The general form of Keltham learning about Cheliax tends to be of the form of “why people are this stupid?” being explained by there existing a bad environment. Markets are screwy because there are no good roads and not simply because traders are stupid. It tends to make fixing the situation more pressing but less judgy for the actors. Infrastructure that Keltham just took for granted is revealed to have conditions for existing.
In the story the “societally right” person in Cheliax is expected to be Evil (which has a narrower meaning in the setting). The bashing and shaming of peoples Good parts would work throught the same logic. There is a difference between concieving rationality as “the art of getting more of what you want” vs “the art of getting more of what you want”. The point here is more about “expected to want” vs “actually want” and not about “others want” vs “I want”.
The story involves a lot of “looking down” on people being ineffective because of confusion or out of underdevelopment. The is probably value in being aware of your value structure and not be in error about it but it also feels like that other agents might be categorised to be confused when they are just having a value structure that goes by different lines that you do.
Say that I care about wormless apples a lot and don’t like wormfull apples. I encounter a lot of picks between an apple and an orange. Say that every time the apple has a worm I pick orange. From the perspective of an outsider (which might not have similar worm-detection abilities) it can seem that 100 times out of 1000 I go for the orange instead of the apple. That outsider might then be tempted to think that I am not following a utility function but I am being confused or contradictory in regards to my fruit buying. But in my terms and perception I am. And even if I only had a unconcious ough-field around worms that I non-conceptually intuit are there would that unawareness of the function make me not follow that function?
So if persons whos values are imperceptually complex and fragile to me appear the same as confused persons going around judging everybody that doesn’t make sense in my terms that can make for trying to hammer people from unfamiliar shapes to familiar shapes which could be a form of xenophobia. I guess in Kelthams situation assuming that anybody different is lesser can make sense. And in the area of sexuality Keltham is not sure whether his world is strictly superior. But what about the areas where the comparison is not easy? The general form of Keltham learning about Cheliax tends to be of the form of “why people are this stupid?” being explained by there existing a bad environment. Markets are screwy because there are no good roads and not simply because traders are stupid. It tends to make fixing the situation more pressing but less judgy for the actors. Infrastructure that Keltham just took for granted is revealed to have conditions for existing.
In the story the “societally right” person in Cheliax is expected to be Evil (which has a narrower meaning in the setting). The bashing and shaming of peoples Good parts would work throught the same logic. There is a difference between concieving rationality as “the art of getting more of what you want” vs “the art of getting more of what you want”. The point here is more about “expected to want” vs “actually want” and not about “others want” vs “I want”.