Most other people in my society would help enforce a contract in which a young person is drafted to serve in the military or taxed to give money to the elderly without his consent. A libertarian would not—a moral judgment.
It is not my impression that the draft or taxation operate on the basis of contract. (“Social contract” is a fiction — we’re talking here about actual contracts, entered into by two contracting parties, and enforced by a third; as in the example of marriages in the original post.)
Your claim that the “freedom of contract” view is “amoral” ignores all similar moral decisions.
Sorry, I think we are using “amoral” to mean different things. It was not my intention to say “libertarians are amoral” but rather that the absolute-freedom-of-contract position demands that the enforcing party not be moved by any objections to any possible contract terms. I thought this was perfectly clear; apparently not.
In order for parties A and B to have “absolute freedom of contract”, the enforcing party C (e.g. the state — or a cooperative, the neighbors, a Nozickian private agency, or what-have-you) must ask no questions beyond “Is this really a contract between A and B?” If so, enforce it; if not, don’t enforce. If C is ever moved by objections to contract terms and ever declines to enforce, then A and B do not have absolute freedom of contract with respect to C’s enforcement.
Rich men can afford to enforce their own contracts
It is not my impression that the draft or taxation operate on the basis of contract. (“Social contract” is a fiction — we’re talking here about actual contracts, entered into by two contracting parties, and enforced by a third; as in the example of marriages in the original post.)
Sorry, I think we are using “amoral” to mean different things. It was not my intention to say “libertarians are amoral” but rather that the absolute-freedom-of-contract position demands that the enforcing party not be moved by any objections to any possible contract terms. I thought this was perfectly clear; apparently not.
In order for parties A and B to have “absolute freedom of contract”, the enforcing party C (e.g. the state — or a cooperative, the neighbors, a Nozickian private agency, or what-have-you) must ask no questions beyond “Is this really a contract between A and B?” If so, enforce it; if not, don’t enforce. If C is ever moved by objections to contract terms and ever declines to enforce, then A and B do not have absolute freedom of contract with respect to C’s enforcement.
Only in extreme cases.