I already understood you; let me try a similar example until the converse is true. Most other people in my society would help enforce a contract in which a young person is drafted to serve in the military or taxed to give money to the elderly without his consent. A libertarian would not—a moral judgment. Your claim that the “freedom of contract” view is “amoral” ignores all similar moral decisions. You could make a good case for “immoral”, based on a morality that weighs the dangers of military inadequacy or the suffering of transfer payment recipients more highly than an individual’s right to control their life or money, but that exposes the fact that people have to choose a system of morality and that the ones who believe in “freedom of contract” have indeed already started to do so.
But that was (I thought) just a nitpick about vocabulary. Ironically your example weakened your excellent argument slightly. Asking why society should enforce contracts which society wouldn’t consent to enforce was a very good point, but in your hypothetical case (and now, I see, many others) would it matter? Rich men can afford to enforce their own contracts; in practice all the government and society would need to do would be double-checking that they didn’t have cause to interfere. When defining “cause” in this hypothetical it would still be important to specify the underlying system of morality; although there are certainly many decision theories that make it impossible for Parfit’s hitchhiker to precommit to pay, IIRC most consider that to be a bug.
Most other people in my society would help enforce a contract in which a young person is drafted to serve in the military or taxed to give money to the elderly without his consent. A libertarian would not—a moral judgment.
It is not my impression that the draft or taxation operate on the basis of contract. (“Social contract” is a fiction — we’re talking here about actual contracts, entered into by two contracting parties, and enforced by a third; as in the example of marriages in the original post.)
Your claim that the “freedom of contract” view is “amoral” ignores all similar moral decisions.
Sorry, I think we are using “amoral” to mean different things. It was not my intention to say “libertarians are amoral” but rather that the absolute-freedom-of-contract position demands that the enforcing party not be moved by any objections to any possible contract terms. I thought this was perfectly clear; apparently not.
In order for parties A and B to have “absolute freedom of contract”, the enforcing party C (e.g. the state — or a cooperative, the neighbors, a Nozickian private agency, or what-have-you) must ask no questions beyond “Is this really a contract between A and B?” If so, enforce it; if not, don’t enforce. If C is ever moved by objections to contract terms and ever declines to enforce, then A and B do not have absolute freedom of contract with respect to C’s enforcement.
Rich men can afford to enforce their own contracts
I already understood you; let me try a similar example until the converse is true. Most other people in my society would help enforce a contract in which a young person is drafted to serve in the military or taxed to give money to the elderly without his consent. A libertarian would not—a moral judgment. Your claim that the “freedom of contract” view is “amoral” ignores all similar moral decisions. You could make a good case for “immoral”, based on a morality that weighs the dangers of military inadequacy or the suffering of transfer payment recipients more highly than an individual’s right to control their life or money, but that exposes the fact that people have to choose a system of morality and that the ones who believe in “freedom of contract” have indeed already started to do so.
But that was (I thought) just a nitpick about vocabulary. Ironically your example weakened your excellent argument slightly. Asking why society should enforce contracts which society wouldn’t consent to enforce was a very good point, but in your hypothetical case (and now, I see, many others) would it matter? Rich men can afford to enforce their own contracts; in practice all the government and society would need to do would be double-checking that they didn’t have cause to interfere. When defining “cause” in this hypothetical it would still be important to specify the underlying system of morality; although there are certainly many decision theories that make it impossible for Parfit’s hitchhiker to precommit to pay, IIRC most consider that to be a bug.
It is not my impression that the draft or taxation operate on the basis of contract. (“Social contract” is a fiction — we’re talking here about actual contracts, entered into by two contracting parties, and enforced by a third; as in the example of marriages in the original post.)
Sorry, I think we are using “amoral” to mean different things. It was not my intention to say “libertarians are amoral” but rather that the absolute-freedom-of-contract position demands that the enforcing party not be moved by any objections to any possible contract terms. I thought this was perfectly clear; apparently not.
In order for parties A and B to have “absolute freedom of contract”, the enforcing party C (e.g. the state — or a cooperative, the neighbors, a Nozickian private agency, or what-have-you) must ask no questions beyond “Is this really a contract between A and B?” If so, enforce it; if not, don’t enforce. If C is ever moved by objections to contract terms and ever declines to enforce, then A and B do not have absolute freedom of contract with respect to C’s enforcement.
Only in extreme cases.