As for the actual question: not all lives are equal, and the sort of life you can extend for $2,000 (or your old $800 figure) is probably not worth .2-.5 times as much as a life chosen at random across the Earth, and the difference is probably larger than the few thousand dollars you pick up.
That’s a good answer. However, I can just change the dollar values to increase it to 30 people saved, or whatever. I wouldn’t call it a LCPW (least convenient possible world) issue, but it’s an easy modification to the thought experiment.
However, I can just change the dollar values to increase it to 30 people saved, or whatever.
Sure, but it seems to me that the effectiveness of the box is (should be) a critical factor in deciding whether or not to use it. If the number of people saved is small enough, it seems like the box shouldn’t be used; if the number of people saved is big enough, it seems like the box should be used. The point at which we switch from not using it to using it is a number we should be willing and able to calculate before we use the box.
It’s not clear to me that objection is meaningful in this case. I’m not ducking the question- I’m making the statement that lives have dollar values associated with them, and you need to use those values for judgments rather than counting heads. If, in the LCPW, everyone were equally valuable, then my approach gives the answer I would expect it to give: it’s better for 5 people to live than 1.
I’m comfortable with how this reasoning extends. Consider a real-world example: instead of a magic box this is an actual policy question- “should we run a polluting power plant which is personally profitable and powers a hospital, thus saving lives, even though we know the pollution will kill someone?” Put a dollar cost on the life lost due to pollution, put dollar values on the lives saved by the hospital, add the values to your profit and subtract the life lost, and you have a cost-benefit analysis.
Rather than being a vague ethical question, that highlights some practical policy advice. Pollution should be taxed, so that the cost of the life lost due to pollution is forced to be part of my calculation. That’s also advice I live, whereas I don’t know if I would push fat men towards trains: I think that the optimal level of pollution is not 0.
People have different willingness and ability to pay for life and happiness, so you still ought to adjust by that. But if you have an option that makes you richer and on net increases the cost-adjusted happiness/life of other people, then that sounds like an option worth considering.
As for the actual question: not all lives are equal, and the sort of life you can extend for $2,000 (or your old $800 figure) is probably not worth .2-.5 times as much as a life chosen at random across the Earth, and the difference is probably larger than the few thousand dollars you pick up.
That’s a good answer. However, I can just change the dollar values to increase it to 30 people saved, or whatever. I wouldn’t call it a LCPW (least convenient possible world) issue, but it’s an easy modification to the thought experiment.
Sure, but it seems to me that the effectiveness of the box is (should be) a critical factor in deciding whether or not to use it. If the number of people saved is small enough, it seems like the box shouldn’t be used; if the number of people saved is big enough, it seems like the box should be used. The point at which we switch from not using it to using it is a number we should be willing and able to calculate before we use the box.
LCPW wouldn’t have this issue.
It’s not clear to me that objection is meaningful in this case. I’m not ducking the question- I’m making the statement that lives have dollar values associated with them, and you need to use those values for judgments rather than counting heads. If, in the LCPW, everyone were equally valuable, then my approach gives the answer I would expect it to give: it’s better for 5 people to live than 1.
I’m comfortable with how this reasoning extends. Consider a real-world example: instead of a magic box this is an actual policy question- “should we run a polluting power plant which is personally profitable and powers a hospital, thus saving lives, even though we know the pollution will kill someone?” Put a dollar cost on the life lost due to pollution, put dollar values on the lives saved by the hospital, add the values to your profit and subtract the life lost, and you have a cost-benefit analysis.
Rather than being a vague ethical question, that highlights some practical policy advice. Pollution should be taxed, so that the cost of the life lost due to pollution is forced to be part of my calculation. That’s also advice I live, whereas I don’t know if I would push fat men towards trains: I think that the optimal level of pollution is not 0.
How about adding and subtracting ‘years of averagely happy life’
People have different willingness and ability to pay for life and happiness, so you still ought to adjust by that. But if you have an option that makes you richer and on net increases the cost-adjusted happiness/life of other people, then that sounds like an option worth considering.