Writing this just for my own future reference to be able to figure out how calibrated I was in retrospect:
38%* unemployment in 2029 is unhinged, and there’s no realistic path to hitting that target in the next two and a third years, even if models get good enough to automate all work within that time period (which I also think seems unlikely).
This will likely backfire in the same way 2027 did, PR-wise, because they do not make it clear enough that this is not, whatsoever, a median prediction. It will likely be taken by the wider public as, “Look at these AI researchers convinced of their doomsday cult’s wisdom trying to boost valuations pre-IPO.”
2nd edit to stop more Linchings: They aren’t talking about prime-age labor force participation rate in the doc. This comment was written under the assumption that they were, because total LFPR is basically useless as a statistic.
Unless I’m missing something, I don’t think they’re suggesting 48% unemployment by 2029. It was initially confusing for me too, but they’re using employment rate as defined (from clicking on it):
“Percentage of Americans who have jobs. As machine labor gets cheaper than people at more and more tasks, wages fall and workers leave paid work.
This is notably different from the complement of the unemployment rate[1]. For example, Percentage of Americans who have jobs includes people not actively searching for jobs too like stay at home parents, and the 62% (not 52%) number seems to be around the current employment rate.
Also, the authors can clarify but the pre-2029 predictions seem to be around their median timelines. You mention AI 2027 too, but I believe Daniel Kokotajlo’s median TAI timelines were actually 2027-2028 (and then they slightly lengthened afterwards).
Fwiw when people talk about the “unemployment rate”, both colloquially and in political discussions, they’re usually referring to U-3, which is unemployed people who sought work some time in the last 4 weeks. It is currently at 4.2%.
This makes a lot of sense as a short-term/political category, but makes less sense if we’re envisioning long-term changes.
I dunno if prime-age LFPR instead of LFPR would make Plan A easier to digest (and would tentatively bet against). An obvious problem with that is that the numbers will be closer to U-3 so misunderstanding the number would be more common.
Regardless I think the exact metric doesn’t matter as much as long as it’s well-defined, the distribution of changes matter more.
Writing this just for my own future reference to be able to figure out how calibrated I was in retrospect:
38%* unemployment in 2029 is unhinged, and there’s no realistic path to hitting that target in the next two and a third years, even if models get good enough to automate all work within that time period (which I also think seems unlikely).
This will likely backfire in the same way 2027 did, PR-wise, because they do not make it clear enough that this is not, whatsoever, a median prediction. It will likely be taken by the wider public as, “Look at these AI researchers convinced of their doomsday cult’s wisdom trying to boost valuations pre-IPO.”
* Edited due to mistyping a number.
2nd edit to stop more Linchings: They aren’t talking about prime-age labor force participation rate in the doc. This comment was written under the assumption that they were, because total LFPR is basically useless as a statistic.
Unless I’m missing something, I don’t think they’re suggesting 48% unemployment by 2029. It was initially confusing for me too, but they’re using employment rate as defined (from clicking on it):
This is notably different from the complement of the unemployment rate[1]. For example, Percentage of Americans who have jobs includes people not actively searching for jobs too like stay at home parents, and the 62% (not 52%) number seems to be around the current employment rate.
Also, the authors can clarify but the pre-2029 predictions seem to be around their median timelines. You mention AI 2027 too, but I believe Daniel Kokotajlo’s median TAI timelines were actually 2027-2028 (and then they slightly lengthened afterwards).
As in, it’s not Employment Rate = (100% - Unemployment Rate)
(In addition, those timelines indeed don’t make sense, or at least so far no one has been willing to explain how they make sense.)
Sorry who’s claiming 48% unemployment in 2029?
LFPR in the US is currently 61.5% so to “drop” to 62% in 2029 you need approximately a −0.5% change.
Vivek already pointed this out.
Your comment still does not make sense to me.
Well, yes. It was, as Vivek already pointed out, based on a misunderstanding of what was meant by a number.
I was assuming it was based around prime-age LFPR; it wasn’t. I still think the end conclusion in my comment is more or less true, however.
Fwiw when people talk about the “unemployment rate”, both colloquially and in political discussions, they’re usually referring to U-3, which is unemployed people who sought work some time in the last 4 weeks. It is currently at 4.2%.
This makes a lot of sense as a short-term/political category, but makes less sense if we’re envisioning long-term changes.
I dunno if prime-age LFPR instead of LFPR would make Plan A easier to digest (and would tentatively bet against). An obvious problem with that is that the numbers will be closer to U-3 so misunderstanding the number would be more common.
Regardless I think the exact metric doesn’t matter as much as long as it’s well-defined, the distribution of changes matter more.
This was already edited hours before you made your react & reply.