I’d be interested to hear how this compares with Wolfgang Schwarz’s ideas in ‘Imaginary Foundations’ and ‘From Sensor Variables to Phenomenal Facts’. Sounds like there’s some overlap, and Schwarz has a kind of explanation for why the hard problem might arise that you might be able to draw on.
There’s some overlap indeed. In particular, it definitely aligns with my model of why the redness of red is “flavoured” as the redness of red and not as burning your fingers (because it’s routed through the associations in our world-model). But it seems to jump too quickly to “having senses + WM implies qualia”; I think the self-awareness loop I’d described is still necessary on top of that.
I’d be interested to hear how this compares with Wolfgang Schwarz’s ideas in ‘Imaginary Foundations’ and ‘From Sensor Variables to Phenomenal Facts’. Sounds like there’s some overlap, and Schwarz has a kind of explanation for why the hard problem might arise that you might be able to draw on.
Link to the second of the papers mentioned: https://www.umsu.de/papers/sensorfacts.pdf
There’s some overlap indeed. In particular, it definitely aligns with my model of why the redness of red is “flavoured” as the redness of red and not as burning your fingers (because it’s routed through the associations in our world-model). But it seems to jump too quickly to “having senses + WM implies qualia”; I think the self-awareness loop I’d described is still necessary on top of that.