What would be the evolutionary advantage of the appearances of suffering, in a world before humans?
Let’s first consider a related question that is independent of any theories of consciousness: Think of all the postures and behaviors by which we infer that an animal is suffering. Why are those postures and behaviors what they are? I would think that generally they have a functional value as a response to damage, danger, etc. The injured paw is pulled back so it won’t be damaged further. The cry of terror causes an animal’s kin to also go on alert.
I suppose the idea would be, that all of this evolves purely for its functional advantages, and without any qualia present. Note that nervous systems would still be processing information and forming representations—it’s just that none of this would have any associated qualia.
Then at some point the brain evolves the capacity of self-representation, and apparently according to Eliezer’s intuition, this is when qualia first come into being. A slogan could be, no qualia without a self to feel them, and no self without self-representation.
Also, wouldn’t that be an argument in favor of p-zombies? I mean, if appearances of qualia can evolve...
Within this framework, a p-zombie would be something that had self-representations but no qualia.
Trying out this theory suggests two fundamental questions to me. Can you have qualia without a self? And if you can, do qualia without a self have ethical significance? I think a theory of consciousness that is proposed in the context of alignment theory ought to be able to answer those two questions, and provide some kind of argeument in favor of its answers.
Thanks for the explanation, but I am not completely satisfied with it. You can explain a lot of what humans do by functional advantages, so… to put it bluntly, is it morally okay to torture people who are insufficiently introspective? Are Buddhist meditators utility monsters?
Let’s first consider a related question that is independent of any theories of consciousness: Think of all the postures and behaviors by which we infer that an animal is suffering. Why are those postures and behaviors what they are? I would think that generally they have a functional value as a response to damage, danger, etc. The injured paw is pulled back so it won’t be damaged further. The cry of terror causes an animal’s kin to also go on alert.
I suppose the idea would be, that all of this evolves purely for its functional advantages, and without any qualia present. Note that nervous systems would still be processing information and forming representations—it’s just that none of this would have any associated qualia.
Then at some point the brain evolves the capacity of self-representation, and apparently according to Eliezer’s intuition, this is when qualia first come into being. A slogan could be, no qualia without a self to feel them, and no self without self-representation.
Within this framework, a p-zombie would be something that had self-representations but no qualia.
Trying out this theory suggests two fundamental questions to me. Can you have qualia without a self? And if you can, do qualia without a self have ethical significance? I think a theory of consciousness that is proposed in the context of alignment theory ought to be able to answer those two questions, and provide some kind of argeument in favor of its answers.
Thanks for the explanation, but I am not completely satisfied with it. You can explain a lot of what humans do by functional advantages, so… to put it bluntly, is it morally okay to torture people who are insufficiently introspective? Are Buddhist meditators utility monsters?