Gilbert’s book, Stumbling On Happiness, describes the research. People’s ability to predict what will make them happy is even WORSE than your post makes it sound. Much worse.
In fact, it really does take an entire book to properly explain just HOW bad we are at guessing what will make us happy, although one could argue that near vs. far thinking has an awful lot to do with it.
(I routinely find that people who have difficulty setting or achieving goals (or who achieve them and aren’t satisfied), are people who haven’t immersively imagined what it would be like to live day-to-day with the getting or having of the goal. Immersive imagination, using “ideal day” exercises (e.g. imagining in present-tense detail what it would be like to live through a day where you have achieved your goal) usually provides surprising feedback on whether the goal is actually a good idea, and what modifications might need to be made.)
I am a big believer in this idea of realistic or immersive imagining. I submit that many people in the LW empirical personspace cluster spend far too much time on unrealistic fantasizing (e.g. through reading sci-fi/fantasy books), and that this is highly detrimental to their well-being. I used to live in a fantasy world myself; I’m slowly trying to break the habit.
When I tell people I think they should cut down on their consumption of fantasy novels they say “No, it’s important to be imaginative!” Absolutely, but it’s way more important to imagine realistic outcomes than to imagine castles in the air (I have a soft spot for the idea of cities on the water).
Immersive imagining is probably a good example of an important rationalist technique. I suspect it’s hard to do well, but skill can be achieved through training.
Immersive imagining sounds to me like Detached Detail. Even if your imagined details are “realistic” and “immersive”, those qualities do not move them outside of the realm of Detached.
Compare your “I like seasteading but not castles in the air.” statement with a claim “I like medieval reenactment but only with historical accuracy.” It seems clear to me that this is merely a preference over fantasies, not a fundamental difference in thought process.
I agree. I don’t understand the praise the book has received. I found the reasoning in the book very sloppy, filled with huge gaps in the logic and more obvious alternate explanations for experimental results that were not even mentioned.
I don’t expect the rigor of a research paper in a popular science book, but even popular science books have standards. I’m sure his papers fill in all the gaps in the book, but if there are multiple obvious explanations for an experimental result and you’re going to tell your readers how to interpret the results, you should at least say why the other obvious (sometimes more obvious) interpretations are less plausible or why the preferred interpretation is so compelling—even in a popular science book.
Yes, it’s a great book. Read it last month and loaned it to a friend who loved it too. Stupid title though, makes it sound like a self-help book, and the cover isn’t any better.
The trouble with making these predictions really is lack of information. If you were told everything about an experience (IE you experienced it! Maybe virually) then probably your guess would be better than the advice of someone who has. But it’s impossible to do that. Spoken word certainly don’t have the bandwidth to convey an entire experience. They do have the bandwidth to convey “Was it fun?” though.
Gilbert’s book, Stumbling On Happiness, describes the research. People’s ability to predict what will make them happy is even WORSE than your post makes it sound. Much worse.
In fact, it really does take an entire book to properly explain just HOW bad we are at guessing what will make us happy, although one could argue that near vs. far thinking has an awful lot to do with it.
(I routinely find that people who have difficulty setting or achieving goals (or who achieve them and aren’t satisfied), are people who haven’t immersively imagined what it would be like to live day-to-day with the getting or having of the goal. Immersive imagination, using “ideal day” exercises (e.g. imagining in present-tense detail what it would be like to live through a day where you have achieved your goal) usually provides surprising feedback on whether the goal is actually a good idea, and what modifications might need to be made.)
I am a big believer in this idea of realistic or immersive imagining. I submit that many people in the LW empirical personspace cluster spend far too much time on unrealistic fantasizing (e.g. through reading sci-fi/fantasy books), and that this is highly detrimental to their well-being. I used to live in a fantasy world myself; I’m slowly trying to break the habit.
When I tell people I think they should cut down on their consumption of fantasy novels they say “No, it’s important to be imaginative!” Absolutely, but it’s way more important to imagine realistic outcomes than to imagine castles in the air (I have a soft spot for the idea of cities on the water).
Immersive imagining is probably a good example of an important rationalist technique. I suspect it’s hard to do well, but skill can be achieved through training.
Immersive imagining sounds to me like Detached Detail. Even if your imagined details are “realistic” and “immersive”, those qualities do not move them outside of the realm of Detached.
Compare your “I like seasteading but not castles in the air.” statement with a claim “I like medieval reenactment but only with historical accuracy.” It seems clear to me that this is merely a preference over fantasies, not a fundamental difference in thought process.
I was very unimpressed by the case made in Gilbert’s book.
Why?
I agree. I don’t understand the praise the book has received. I found the reasoning in the book very sloppy, filled with huge gaps in the logic and more obvious alternate explanations for experimental results that were not even mentioned.
I don’t expect the rigor of a research paper in a popular science book, but even popular science books have standards. I’m sure his papers fill in all the gaps in the book, but if there are multiple obvious explanations for an experimental result and you’re going to tell your readers how to interpret the results, you should at least say why the other obvious (sometimes more obvious) interpretations are less plausible or why the preferred interpretation is so compelling—even in a popular science book.
For some examples of what I mean, see this Amazon.com review.
Actually, the point of my post is that I am unconvinced that the study is meaningful.
Yes, it’s a great book. Read it last month and loaned it to a friend who loved it too. Stupid title though, makes it sound like a self-help book, and the cover isn’t any better.
The trouble with making these predictions really is lack of information. If you were told everything about an experience (IE you experienced it! Maybe virually) then probably your guess would be better than the advice of someone who has. But it’s impossible to do that. Spoken word certainly don’t have the bandwidth to convey an entire experience. They do have the bandwidth to convey “Was it fun?” though.