The current cold war didn’t start with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Maybe with the invasion of Georgia or of the Crimean peninsula or with the constant threats against the Baltic states.
But now the West has clearly realized it, and my point is that this has some potential to reduce the threat.
He threatened us when he invaded Ukraine, and threatened us again when there was the proposal of establishing a no-fly zone in Ukraine (“the consequences would be catastrophic for the entire world”).
During the Cold War nobody would have come up with a proposal like a no-fly zone during a regional war of one of both sides. The US didn’t even dream of proposing a no-fly zone over Afghanistan when the Russians invaded. The Soviet Union didn’t think of a no-fly zone over North Vietnam, either, I believe. Because both sides understood perfectly well the implications of such an act. It wasn’t necessary to make an explicit threat.
And I don’t think the Ukraine really thought it could get a no-fly zone. I see this more as a negotiation tool in the sense of requesting something huge that the other side is probably not willing to give in order to then get something smaller, which is a very effective tactic.
I don’t have memory of any other leader of a big nuclear power threatening the world with nuclear war if we meddle with their business, i.e. willing the risk world anihilation to accomplish his objectives.
Nixon comes to mind, Operation Giant Lance. It is hard to tell to what extent Putin is irrational and to what extent Putin projects irrationality as a tool, as in Nixon’s Madman Theory of foreign diplomacy.
And furthermore, there is a distinction to be made between different levels of change in the risk for nuclear war: a) How likely was a nuclear war before Russia’s invasion? How likely is it now? That is what I have tried to adress. b) As how likely was a nuclear war perceived before the invasion and as how likely is it perceived now?
It is quite possible that the risk for a nuclear war has been stable or even decreased, and that, at the same time, the widespread perception of a hightened risk is correct in the sense that on average the current risk assessment is more realistic than the risk assessment was before the war.
Exactly. And it’s also a question of magnitude. So we can effectively say that the “real” start is now, despite some precedents.
On no fly-zones, true, it would be out of question for NATO. Only Ukraine proposed it, desperate as they are. However, what matters is not the proposal, but Putin’s nuclear threat, and the ease with which he keeps making them.
I confess I didn’t know about Nixon’s madman theory and Operation Giant Lance, but firstly we can still say that we hadn’t had this type of behavior for half a century, second and more importantly, Nixon’s game with that specific operation was way less dangerous, since according to Wikipedia:
“The operation was kept top secret from both the general public and higher authorities within the Strategic Air Command, intended to only be noticed by Russian intelligence.[4][5] The operation lasted one month before being called off.[4][5]”
So, it was kept top secret and only lasted a month. Whereas with Putin he’s openly threatening the whole world and his endeavors have lasted way longer—and more importantly, we don’t know HOW LONG they’re gonna last, i.e. if he’ll actually end up invading a NATO country. Totally different orders of magnitude.
So, yes, I agree he’s definitely playing madman theory. The problem is (obsviously) - it’s a dangerous game. It necessarily implies risking nuclear war to achieve your objectives, even if you’re indeed bluffing. The opponent can call your bluff, and then nuclear war starts. I.e., Putin invades a NATO country like one of the Baltics, thinking “ah, those Westerners are too pussy to care about these poor economies here, they won’t wanna go to war to defend it, so I can just take it”. But then NATO maybe goes like “well, we don’t care much about the Baltics indeed, but if we don’t stop him now he’s never gonna stop” so WW3 starts.
That’s why in my opinion your argument doesn’t really contradict mine.
On your last point on nuclear risk, maybe it is true that current risk assessment is more realistic now, but that doesn’t change the fact that it can still have significantly increased with the Ukrainian war. I mean, in my view the reason is pretty simple, it’s that you can’t compare Putin’s last invasions, say Georgia and Crimea, with Ukraine. The West could afford to tolerate those. With Ukraine, totally different: 1) it’s gonna be a lot more bloody (Georgia and Crimea barely resisted), causing much more of a humanitarian catastrophe and global instability, 2) it’s a buffer state, with a great size and population, with much more strategic importance and affinity to Europe. So it’s definitely a turning point, to deny this is over indulging in skepticism in my view.
“Retired general Rick Hillier, former commander of the Canadian military, has described a no-fly zone as a necessary response to Russian aggression.”
Other people who ought to know better have also advocated for a no-fly zone. And the general tone of much commentary has the logic of going from “the invasion is a horrible crime of aggression” to “we must do whatever is necessary to stop it”, without stopping to consider that in this world it is not always possible to achieve anything close to the maximally desirable outcome.
The current cold war didn’t start with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Maybe with the invasion of Georgia or of the Crimean peninsula or with the constant threats against the Baltic states.
But now the West has clearly realized it, and my point is that this has some potential to reduce the threat.
During the Cold War nobody would have come up with a proposal like a no-fly zone during a regional war of one of both sides. The US didn’t even dream of proposing a no-fly zone over Afghanistan when the Russians invaded. The Soviet Union didn’t think of a no-fly zone over North Vietnam, either, I believe. Because both sides understood perfectly well the implications of such an act. It wasn’t necessary to make an explicit threat.
And I don’t think the Ukraine really thought it could get a no-fly zone. I see this more as a negotiation tool in the sense of requesting something huge that the other side is probably not willing to give in order to then get something smaller, which is a very effective tactic.
Nixon comes to mind, Operation Giant Lance. It is hard to tell to what extent Putin is irrational and to what extent Putin projects irrationality as a tool, as in Nixon’s Madman Theory of foreign diplomacy.
And furthermore, there is a distinction to be made between different levels of change in the risk for nuclear war:
a) How likely was a nuclear war before Russia’s invasion? How likely is it now? That is what I have tried to adress.
b) As how likely was a nuclear war perceived before the invasion and as how likely is it perceived now?
It is quite possible that the risk for a nuclear war has been stable or even decreased, and that, at the same time, the widespread perception of a hightened risk is correct in the sense that on average the current risk assessment is more realistic than the risk assessment was before the war.
“But now the West has clearly realized it”
Exactly. And it’s also a question of magnitude. So we can effectively say that the “real” start is now, despite some precedents.
On no fly-zones, true, it would be out of question for NATO. Only Ukraine proposed it, desperate as they are. However, what matters is not the proposal, but Putin’s nuclear threat, and the ease with which he keeps making them.
I confess I didn’t know about Nixon’s madman theory and Operation Giant Lance, but firstly we can still say that we hadn’t had this type of behavior for half a century, second and more importantly, Nixon’s game with that specific operation was way less dangerous, since according to Wikipedia:
“The operation was kept top secret from both the general public and higher authorities within the Strategic Air Command, intended to only be noticed by Russian intelligence.[4][5] The operation lasted one month before being called off.[4][5]”
So, it was kept top secret and only lasted a month. Whereas with Putin he’s openly threatening the whole world and his endeavors have lasted way longer—and more importantly, we don’t know HOW LONG they’re gonna last, i.e. if he’ll actually end up invading a NATO country. Totally different orders of magnitude.
So, yes, I agree he’s definitely playing madman theory. The problem is (obsviously) - it’s a dangerous game. It necessarily implies risking nuclear war to achieve your objectives, even if you’re indeed bluffing. The opponent can call your bluff, and then nuclear war starts. I.e., Putin invades a NATO country like one of the Baltics, thinking “ah, those Westerners are too pussy to care about these poor economies here, they won’t wanna go to war to defend it, so I can just take it”. But then NATO maybe goes like “well, we don’t care much about the Baltics indeed, but if we don’t stop him now he’s never gonna stop” so WW3 starts.
That’s why in my opinion your argument doesn’t really contradict mine.
On your last point on nuclear risk, maybe it is true that current risk assessment is more realistic now, but that doesn’t change the fact that it can still have significantly increased with the Ukrainian war. I mean, in my view the reason is pretty simple, it’s that you can’t compare Putin’s last invasions, say Georgia and Crimea, with Ukraine. The West could afford to tolerate those. With Ukraine, totally different: 1) it’s gonna be a lot more bloody (Georgia and Crimea barely resisted), causing much more of a humanitarian catastrophe and global instability, 2) it’s a buffer state, with a great size and population, with much more strategic importance and affinity to Europe. So it’s definitely a turning point, to deny this is over indulging in skepticism in my view.
You say: “On no fly-zones, true, it would be out of question for NATO. Only Ukraine proposed it, desperate as they are.”
Unfortunately, not true. From https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/poroshenko-no-fly-zone-1.6370760
“Retired general Rick Hillier, former commander of the Canadian military, has described a no-fly zone as a necessary response to Russian aggression.”
Other people who ought to know better have also advocated for a no-fly zone. And the general tone of much commentary has the logic of going from “the invasion is a horrible crime of aggression” to “we must do whatever is necessary to stop it”, without stopping to consider that in this world it is not always possible to achieve anything close to the maximally desirable outcome.