The hard problem asks, how can you take the physical description of a human and explain its Real Sensations—our experiences that are supposed to have their own extra essences, or to be directly observed by an “us” that is an objective existence.
The hard problem is more like “what part of the Schrödinger equation says that it describes non-zombie world”—you can point out the part, where human body doesn’t act like an agent (with interesting goals) if it is placed in the vacuum, and in principle why it does, when it does, but there are more issues with doing this with what people think of as consciousness. Personally I think panpsychism gives satisfying enough answer (“the part, where we say that the world it describes is real”), and so there is not much disagreement between hard problem and ethically-significant consciousness being non-fundamental. But it doesn’t mean the hard problem is meaningless.
The hard problem is more like “what part of the Schrödinger equation says that it describes non-zombie world”—you can point out the part, where human body doesn’t act like an agent (with interesting goals) if it is placed in the vacuum, and in principle why it does, when it does, but there are more issues with doing this with what people think of as consciousness. Personally I think panpsychism gives satisfying enough answer (“the part, where we say that the world it describes is real”), and so there is not much disagreement between hard problem and ethically-significant consciousness being non-fundamental. But it doesn’t mean the hard problem is meaningless.