The ellipsis is, “genuinely prefer others’ well-being over a marginal increase in their own,” from the previous sentence.
They have to be smarter to recognize their actual beliefs and investigate what is consistent with them. They have to be more honest, because there is social pressure to think things like, “oh of course I care about others,” and hide how much or little they care.
I still do not understand it. Could I ask you to please rephrase the sentence “However, a lot of people...” so it expresses what you intended to say, as exactly as reasonably possible?
Are you saying that no one genuinely agrees with Peter Singer’s conclusion (that you should sacrifice your own convenience to save a stranger)? And that everyone who claims to agree with Singer either (1) lies or (2) is too stupid to know their own beliefs?
There are also people that genuinely prefer others’ well-being over a marginal increase in theirs—mostly wealthy or ascetic folks—and I think this is the target audience of EA evangelism. However, a lot of people don’t genuinely prefer others’ well-bing over a marginal increase in their own (or at least, the margin is pretty small), but these people still end up caught with Singer’s thought experiment, not realizing that the conclusions it leads them to (e.g. that they should donate to GiveWell) are inconsistent with their more fundamental values.
Are you taking into account the distinction between the preferences that people act on and the preferences that people wished they would act on? I don’t know if there is any standard terminology for this (in philosophy or on LessWrong), but an obvious example is the smoker who struggles to stop smoking. It is possible to “prefer” one’s own convenience and luxury, and at the same time want to be a “better person” by doing more for others.
I get the impression that you think the majority of rationalists actually prefer their own convenience over effective altruism even though they maybe deluded or dishonest about it. What evidence do you base this on?
If you “want to stop smoking” or “want to donate more” but do not, you are either deluding yourself, lacking intelligence, or preferring ignorance. Deluding yourself can make you feel happier about yourself. “I’m the kind of person who wants to help out other people! Just not the kind who actually does [but let’s not think about that].” Arguably, this is what you really prefer: to be happy, whether or not your thoughts are conistent with your behavior. If you are smart enough, and really want to get to the bottom of any inconsistencies you find yourself exhibiting, you will, and will no longer be inconsistent. You’ll either bite the bullet and say you actually do prefer the lung cancer over the shakes, or actually quit smoking.
Are the majority of rationalists deluded or dishonest? Absolutely. As I said in my post, utilitarianism is not well-defined, but most rationalists prefer running with the delsuion.
Your posts in this thread ooze with contempt for large swathes of people, on and off LessWrong. In this last post you are not doing much analysis; you are mostly just judging.
I get the impression that your reasoning here is motivated less by a desire to genuinely understand the human mind and more by a desire to dismiss people who disagree with you and feel superior to them.
Please note that this is NOT intended as an attack on you. It is intended as constructive criticism. I am suggesting that you could benefit from being more curious and more aware of your own biases.
The ellipsis is, “genuinely prefer others’ well-being over a marginal increase in their own,” from the previous sentence.
They have to be smarter to recognize their actual beliefs and investigate what is consistent with them. They have to be more honest, because there is social pressure to think things like, “oh of course I care about others,” and hide how much or little they care.
I still do not understand it. Could I ask you to please rephrase the sentence “However, a lot of people...” so it expresses what you intended to say, as exactly as reasonably possible?
Are you saying that no one genuinely agrees with Peter Singer’s conclusion (that you should sacrifice your own convenience to save a stranger)? And that everyone who claims to agree with Singer either (1) lies or (2) is too stupid to know their own beliefs?
There are also people that genuinely prefer others’ well-being over a marginal increase in theirs—mostly wealthy or ascetic folks—and I think this is the target audience of EA evangelism. However, a lot of people don’t genuinely prefer others’ well-bing over a marginal increase in their own (or at least, the margin is pretty small), but these people still end up caught with Singer’s thought experiment, not realizing that the conclusions it leads them to (e.g. that they should donate to GiveWell) are inconsistent with their more fundamental values.
Are you taking into account the distinction between the preferences that people act on and the preferences that people wished they would act on? I don’t know if there is any standard terminology for this (in philosophy or on LessWrong), but an obvious example is the smoker who struggles to stop smoking. It is possible to “prefer” one’s own convenience and luxury, and at the same time want to be a “better person” by doing more for others.
I get the impression that you think the majority of rationalists actually prefer their own convenience over effective altruism even though they maybe deluded or dishonest about it. What evidence do you base this on?
If you “want to stop smoking” or “want to donate more” but do not, you are either deluding yourself, lacking intelligence, or preferring ignorance. Deluding yourself can make you feel happier about yourself. “I’m the kind of person who wants to help out other people! Just not the kind who actually does [but let’s not think about that].” Arguably, this is what you really prefer: to be happy, whether or not your thoughts are conistent with your behavior. If you are smart enough, and really want to get to the bottom of any inconsistencies you find yourself exhibiting, you will, and will no longer be inconsistent. You’ll either bite the bullet and say you actually do prefer the lung cancer over the shakes, or actually quit smoking.
Are the majority of rationalists deluded or dishonest? Absolutely. As I said in my post, utilitarianism is not well-defined, but most rationalists prefer running with the delsuion.
Your posts in this thread ooze with contempt for large swathes of people, on and off LessWrong. In this last post you are not doing much analysis; you are mostly just judging.
I get the impression that your reasoning here is motivated less by a desire to genuinely understand the human mind and more by a desire to dismiss people who disagree with you and feel superior to them.
Please note that this is NOT intended as an attack on you. It is intended as constructive criticism. I am suggesting that you could benefit from being more curious and more aware of your own biases.