If I am not mistaken, China will secure control of the seas before launching an amphibious assault; there is no factor that would compel them to launch such an assault quickly.
At the onset of war, China would use medium-range ballistic missiles (DF-15, 16, 21, 26) and hypersonic missiles (DF-17, 27, YJ-19, 20, 21) to launch a preemptive strike against U.S. military assets stretching from the Philippines to Hawaii, aiming to destroy as many air bases, naval ports, and warehouses as possible.
The U.S. military’s intercept capabilities are insufficient to protect its land-based military assets: The conflict in Iran has already demonstrated that even the THAAD system is highly vulnerable to attacks from ballistic missiles based on 20th-century technology and large numbers of loitering munitions. Most of China’s current ballistic missiles possess penetration speeds and accuracy far surpassing those of Iran’s Scud-based variants, while its most advanced hypersonic missiles can perform evasive maneuvers at speeds exceeding Mach 5. The recent redeployment of THAAD systems from East Asia to the Middle East has further weakened U.S. missile defense capabilities.
Regardless of how much military strength the U.S. and Japan retain after the initial exchange of fire, U.S. Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force reinforcements arriving in East Asia during the next phase of the war will likely be detected by rocket-powered unmanned reconnaissance drones and large reconnaissance aircraft such as the Y-9DZ, triggering a missile exchange: In the most optimistic scenario, the U.S. military might be able to destroy one or two aircraft carriers and numerous Type 055⁄052 destroyers using cruise missiles; however, under a saturation attack involving dozens of hypersonic ballistic missiles and hundreds of sea-skimming anti-ship missiles, the U.S. fleet would suffer even greater losses. The Standard-3 and Standard-6 missiles could intercept some ballistic missiles during the exchange, but their effectiveness may be limited: The Standard-3’s infrared seeker can only guide its kinetic kill warhead outside the atmosphere, while the Standard-6 has a shorter range and slower speed, making it difficult to intercept hypersonic munitions maneuvering within the atmosphere.
Overall, it is unlikely that U.S. military assets in the engagement zone would survive long enough to warrant consideration of the production capacity of high-energy materials.
If I am not mistaken, China will secure control of the seas before launching an amphibious assault; there is no factor that would compel them to launch such an assault quickly. At the onset of war, China would use medium-range ballistic missiles (DF-15, 16, 21, 26) and hypersonic missiles (DF-17, 27, YJ-19, 20, 21) to launch a preemptive strike against U.S. military assets stretching from the Philippines to Hawaii, aiming to destroy as many air bases, naval ports, and warehouses as possible. The U.S. military’s intercept capabilities are insufficient to protect its land-based military assets: The conflict in Iran has already demonstrated that even the THAAD system is highly vulnerable to attacks from ballistic missiles based on 20th-century technology and large numbers of loitering munitions. Most of China’s current ballistic missiles possess penetration speeds and accuracy far surpassing those of Iran’s Scud-based variants, while its most advanced hypersonic missiles can perform evasive maneuvers at speeds exceeding Mach 5. The recent redeployment of THAAD systems from East Asia to the Middle East has further weakened U.S. missile defense capabilities. Regardless of how much military strength the U.S. and Japan retain after the initial exchange of fire, U.S. Navy and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force reinforcements arriving in East Asia during the next phase of the war will likely be detected by rocket-powered unmanned reconnaissance drones and large reconnaissance aircraft such as the Y-9DZ, triggering a missile exchange: In the most optimistic scenario, the U.S. military might be able to destroy one or two aircraft carriers and numerous Type 055⁄052 destroyers using cruise missiles; however, under a saturation attack involving dozens of hypersonic ballistic missiles and hundreds of sea-skimming anti-ship missiles, the U.S. fleet would suffer even greater losses. The Standard-3 and Standard-6 missiles could intercept some ballistic missiles during the exchange, but their effectiveness may be limited: The Standard-3’s infrared seeker can only guide its kinetic kill warhead outside the atmosphere, while the Standard-6 has a shorter range and slower speed, making it difficult to intercept hypersonic munitions maneuvering within the atmosphere. Overall, it is unlikely that U.S. military assets in the engagement zone would survive long enough to warrant consideration of the production capacity of high-energy materials.