Are you saying that it is often useful to bluff the people you are cooperating with, or would it be a once in the blue moon kind of situation? Give an example of it helping?
Drivers often slow down or stop far ahead of time for pedestrians, wasting more of their time to do so than it costs the pedestrian to wait for the car. When I’m on foot and anticipate this, I often bluff the driver by looking away or pretending to change direction. It’s minor, but effective and quite frequent.
Only if you have total knowledge of the situation
What about perfect knowledge of a prisoner’s dilemma involving non-cooperative agents?
Drivers often slow down or stop far ahead of time for pedestrians, wasting more of their
time to do so than it costs the pedestrian to wait for the car. When I’m on foot and
anticipate this, I often bluff the driver by looking away or pretending to change direction.
It’s minor, but effective and quite frequent.
Could you do it by signaling openly?
What about perfect knowledge of a prisoner’s dilemma involving non-cooperative agents?
What do you mean by non-cooperative agents, that they always defect, or don’t communicate? And do the agents have perfect knowledge or is there a third party?
Drivers often slow down or stop far ahead of time for pedestrians, wasting more of their time to do so than it costs the pedestrian to wait for the car. When I’m on foot and anticipate this, I often bluff the driver by looking away or pretending to change direction. It’s minor, but effective and quite frequent.
What about perfect knowledge of a prisoner’s dilemma involving non-cooperative agents?
Could you do it by signaling openly?
What do you mean by non-cooperative agents, that they always defect, or don’t communicate? And do the agents have perfect knowledge or is there a third party?