The workplace example feels different to me because workers can just reason that employers will keep their promises or lose reputation, so it’s not truly one-time.
Agree there are not one-time dynamics, but I would bet that the vast majority of people would have strong intuitions that they shouldn’t defect on the last round of the game (in general, if people truly adopted decision-theories that thought defecting on single-shot games was rational, then all definitive finite games would also end up in defect-defect equilibria via induction, which clearly doesn’t happen).
I’d argue people have norms that they shouldn’t defect on the last round of the game because being trustworthy is useful. This doesn’t generalize to taking whatever actions our monkey-brained approximation of LDT implies we should do according to our monkey-brained judgement of what logical correlations they create.
Yep, sorry, prizes!
Agree there are not one-time dynamics, but I would bet that the vast majority of people would have strong intuitions that they shouldn’t defect on the last round of the game (in general, if people truly adopted decision-theories that thought defecting on single-shot games was rational, then all definitive finite games would also end up in defect-defect equilibria via induction, which clearly doesn’t happen).
I’d argue people have norms that they shouldn’t defect on the last round of the game because being trustworthy is useful. This doesn’t generalize to taking whatever actions our monkey-brained approximation of LDT implies we should do according to our monkey-brained judgement of what logical correlations they create.