Re the dumb thought. I’ve forgotten the author, but as a teenager I was a big SciFi fan (still am actually) and read a short story with exactly this theme. Basically it was the recognition that at some point quantity >= quality. I want to say (have not fact checked myself though) that this was pretty much the USSR’s approach to fighting Germany in WWII—crappy tanks but lots of them.
(Side note, I think for whatever reason, too long a peacetime, more interest in profit than protection, the USA particularly seems to have forgotten that the stuff you use to wage a war are largely all consumables. The non consumable is the industrial base. Clearly there is a minimum cost of producing something that can do the job but much more than that is sub optimal. I am somewhat over simplifying but this also seems to be a fair characterization of where the USA-China naval relationship might be.)
Back to ICBMs, Foreign Affairs had a piece about AI’s potential impact on nuclear deterrence in general but did mention the fixed location of ICBM silos as a problem (long known and why everyone has mobile platforms). They might be considered a prime target for a first strike but the reality is they are easily monitored so the mobile platforms are the big deterrents and probably more interesting problem to solve in terms of obsoleting. But perhaps the ICBM platforms, fixed or mobile, shift to a different type role. Pure kinetic (I believe Russia did that with one of the ballistic warheads with pretty devastating results in Ukraine about a year ago) or rather than all the MIRV decoys for the armed MIRV decoys and other function for other delivery vehicles. I suspect the intercept problem with a nuclear warhead is a bit different from that of just a big mass of something dense.
So maybe perhaps obsolescence in their current function but not for some repurposed role.
Re the dumb thought. I’ve forgotten the author, but as a teenager I was a big SciFi fan (still am actually) and read a short story with exactly this theme. Basically it was the recognition that at some point quantity >= quality. I want to say (have not fact checked myself though) that this was pretty much the USSR’s approach to fighting Germany in WWII—crappy tanks but lots of them.
(Side note, I think for whatever reason, too long a peacetime, more interest in profit than protection, the USA particularly seems to have forgotten that the stuff you use to wage a war are largely all consumables. The non consumable is the industrial base. Clearly there is a minimum cost of producing something that can do the job but much more than that is sub optimal. I am somewhat over simplifying but this also seems to be a fair characterization of where the USA-China naval relationship might be.)
Back to ICBMs, Foreign Affairs had a piece about AI’s potential impact on nuclear deterrence in general but did mention the fixed location of ICBM silos as a problem (long known and why everyone has mobile platforms). They might be considered a prime target for a first strike but the reality is they are easily monitored so the mobile platforms are the big deterrents and probably more interesting problem to solve in terms of obsoleting. But perhaps the ICBM platforms, fixed or mobile, shift to a different type role. Pure kinetic (I believe Russia did that with one of the ballistic warheads with pretty devastating results in Ukraine about a year ago) or rather than all the MIRV decoys for the armed MIRV decoys and other function for other delivery vehicles. I suspect the intercept problem with a nuclear warhead is a bit different from that of just a big mass of something dense.
So maybe perhaps obsolescence in their current function but not for some repurposed role.