Regardless of whether you think Occupy Wall Street is “right,” we should still be able to have a rational discussion about the outcomes, and there’s one outcome in particular that’s been worrying me.
The worst possible outcome, in my opinion, would be if Occupy Wall Street gains enough momentum to become a major political power in the U.S., but not enough to decisively win.
Regardless of what happens Occupy Wall Street will almost definitely polarize the left further from the center, as they have been recently.
If politics is a game of prisoner’s dilema, then the Republicans through the Tea Party have been defecting for the past few years, with no sign of being willing to change to cooperate. Meanwhile, the Democrats have been repeatedly cooperating. If this were a normal prisoner’s dilemma game, then the Democrats should switch to defecting as well.
But, in government there is a third term, ability to operate. Assuming there isn’t a clear majority in all sections of government:
If both parties cooperate, operation is the highest. If one defects and one cooperates, it’s lower, but still there. If both parties decide to defect, the government loses almost all effectiveness. And my fear is that Occupy Wall Street will lead to this outcome.
Leaving the specific politics aside… if party A routinely defects and party B routinely cooperates then the system is no more effective than party A operating on its own, and quite possibly less so, and this is reasonably stable unless party A is incompetent enough that it can’t even maintain power in the absence of opposition. Whereas if parties A and B both routinely defect the system is far less likely to be stable.
Whether that’s better or worse seems to depend a lot on what the outcome of that instability is… that is, if both parties start defecting and the existing system is no longer viable, one important question is: what replaces it, and how soon?
But, in government there is a third term, ability to operate.
How’s this different from ordinary prisoner’s dilemma?
Assuming there isn’t a clear majority in all sections of government:
If both parties cooperate, operation is the highest. If one defects and one cooperates, it’s lower, but still there. If both parties decide to defect, the government loses almost all effectiveness.
This is true at most in the short term. In the medium-to-long term the prisoner’s dilemma is an epistemic prisoner’s dilemma, and effectiveness is determined by the extent to which the people winning the short term prisoner’s dilemmas are pushing the “right” policies. If they aren’t, the level of “operation” is simply a measure of how fast the car is racing towards the edge of a cliff.
Regardless of whether you think Occupy Wall Street is “right,” we should still be able to have a rational discussion about the outcomes, and there’s one outcome in particular that’s been worrying me.
The worst possible outcome, in my opinion, would be if Occupy Wall Street gains enough momentum to become a major political power in the U.S., but not enough to decisively win.
Regardless of what happens Occupy Wall Street will almost definitely polarize the left further from the center, as they have been recently.
If politics is a game of prisoner’s dilema, then the Republicans through the Tea Party have been defecting for the past few years, with no sign of being willing to change to cooperate. Meanwhile, the Democrats have been repeatedly cooperating. If this were a normal prisoner’s dilemma game, then the Democrats should switch to defecting as well.
But, in government there is a third term, ability to operate. Assuming there isn’t a clear majority in all sections of government:
If both parties cooperate, operation is the highest. If one defects and one cooperates, it’s lower, but still there. If both parties decide to defect, the government loses almost all effectiveness. And my fear is that Occupy Wall Street will lead to this outcome.
Leaving the specific politics aside… if party A routinely defects and party B routinely cooperates then the system is no more effective than party A operating on its own, and quite possibly less so, and this is reasonably stable unless party A is incompetent enough that it can’t even maintain power in the absence of opposition. Whereas if parties A and B both routinely defect the system is far less likely to be stable.
Whether that’s better or worse seems to depend a lot on what the outcome of that instability is… that is, if both parties start defecting and the existing system is no longer viable, one important question is: what replaces it, and how soon?
How’s this different from ordinary prisoner’s dilemma?
This is true at most in the short term. In the medium-to-long term the prisoner’s dilemma is an epistemic prisoner’s dilemma, and effectiveness is determined by the extent to which the people winning the short term prisoner’s dilemmas are pushing the “right” policies. If they aren’t, the level of “operation” is simply a measure of how fast the car is racing towards the edge of a cliff.
Or as Sir Humphrey from “Yes, Minister” put it: