You think that Solomonoff induction would predict enormous torture with a non-negligible propbability if it observed the mugger not being paid?
Because Solomonoff induction bases its priors on minimum message length and it’s possible to encode enormous numbers like 3^^^3 in a message of length much less then 3^^^3.
Sure—but the claim there are large numbers of people waiting to be tortured also decreases in probability with the number of people involved.
I figure that Solomonoff induction would give a (correct) tiny probability for this hypothesis being correct.
Your problem is actually not with Solomonoff induction—despite what you say—I figure. Rather you are complaining about some decision theory application of Solomonoff induction—involving the concept of “utility”.
Because Solomonoff induction bases its priors on minimum message length and it’s possible to encode enormous numbers like 3^^^3 in a message of length much less then 3^^^3.
Sure—but the claim there are large numbers of people waiting to be tortured also decreases in probability with the number of people involved.
What does this have to do with my point.
I figure that Solomonoff induction would give a (correct) tiny probability for this hypothesis being correct.
It does, just not tiny enough to override the 3^^^3 utility difference.
Your problem is actually not with Solomonoff induction—despite what you say—I figure. Rather you are complaining about some decision theory application of Solomonoff induction—involving the concept of “utility”.
I don’t have a problem with anything, I’m just trying to correct misconceptions about Pascal’s mugging.
I’m just trying to correct misconceptions about Pascal’s mugging.
Well, your claim was that “Solomonoff induction itself can’t handle Pascal’s mugging”—which appears to be unsubstantiated nonsense. Solomonoff induction will give the correct answer based on Occamian priors and its past experience—which is the best that anyone could reasonably expect from it.
Sure—but the claim there are large numbers of people waiting to be tortured also decreases in probability with the number of people involved.
I figure that Solomonoff induction would give a (correct) tiny probability for this hypothesis being correct.
Your problem is actually not with Solomonoff induction—despite what you say—I figure. Rather you are complaining about some decision theory application of Solomonoff induction—involving the concept of “utility”.
What does this have to do with my point.
It does, just not tiny enough to override the 3^^^3 utility difference.
I don’t have a problem with anything, I’m just trying to correct misconceptions about Pascal’s mugging.
Well, your claim was that “Solomonoff induction itself can’t handle Pascal’s mugging”—which appears to be unsubstantiated nonsense. Solomonoff induction will give the correct answer based on Occamian priors and its past experience—which is the best that anyone could reasonably expect from it.