I think there is more to consider. For example, we can imagine a “qualia rainbow” theory of identity. I don’t necessarily endorse it, but it illustrates why understanding qualia is important for identity.
Imagine that infinitely many different qualia of “reds” could denote one real red. Each person, when born, is randomly initialized with a unique set of qualia for all colors and other sensations. This set can be called a “rainbow of qualia,” and continuous computing in the brain maintains it throughout a person’s life. A copy of me with a different set of qualia, though behaviorally indistinguishable, is not me. Only future mind states with the same set of qualia as mine are truly me, even if my memories were replaced with those of a rat.
Is the qualia rainbow theory a personal choice for deciding which copies to count as “me” and which copies to count as “not me?” Or does the theory say there is an objective flowchart in the universe, which dictates which future observer each observer shall experience becoming, and with what probabilities? If it was objective, could a set of red qualia be observed with a microscope?
I agree that qualia is an important topic (even if we don’t endorse the qualia rainbow theory), I agree that identity is complex, though I still strongly believe that which object contains my future identity is a very subjective choice by me.
The problem with the subjective choice view is that I can’t become Britney Spears. :) If I continue to sit at the table, I will find myself there every next moment even if I try to become someone else. So mapping into the next moments is an objective fact.
Moreover, even a single moment of experience is a mapping between two states of the brain, A and B. For example, moment A is before I see a rose, and moment B is after I see it and say: “A rose!” The experience of a red rose happens after A but before B.
The rainbow of qualia theory is objective but it assumes the existence of a hypothetical instrument: a qualiascope. A qualiascope is a mind which can connect to other minds and compare their experiences. This works the same way as my mind can compare qualia of colors and sounds without being any of them. Whether a qualiascope is physically possible is not obvious, as its observations may disturb the original qualia.
:) what proves that you “can’t become Britney Spears?” Suppose the very next moment, you become her (and she becomes you), but you lose all your memories and gain all of her memories.
As Britney Spears, you won’t be able to say “see, I tried to become Britney Spears, and now I am her,” because you won’t remember that memory of trying to become her. You’ll only remember her boring memories and act like her normal self. If you read on the internet that someone said they tried to become Britney Spears, you’ll laugh about it not realizing that that person used to be you.
Meanwhile if Britney Spears becomes you, she won’t be able to say “wow, I just became someone else.” Instead, she forgets all her memories and gains all your memories, including the memory of trying to become Britney Spears and apparently failing. She will write on the internet “see, I tried to become Britney Spears and it didn’t work,” not realizing that she used to be Britney Spears.
Did this event happen or not? There is no way to prove or disprove it, because in fact whether or not it happened not a valid question about the objective world. The universe has the exact same configuration of atoms in the case where it happened and in the case where it didn’t happen. And the configuration of atoms in the universe is all that exists.
The question of whether it happened or not only exists in your map, not the territory.
Haha but the truth is I don’t understand where “a single moment of experience” comes from. I’m itching to argue that there is no such thing as that either, and no objective measure of how much experience there is in any given object.
I can imagine a machine gradually changing one copy of me to two copies of me (gradually increasing the number causal events), and it feels totally subjective when the “copy count” increases from one to two.
But this indeed becomes paradoxical, since without an objective measure of experience, I cannot say that the copies of me who believe 1+1=2 have a “greater number” or “more weight” than the copies of me who believe 1+1=3. I have no way to explain why I happen to observe that 1+1=2 rather than 1+1=3, or why I’m in a universe where probability seems to follow the Born rule of quantum mechanics.
In the end I admit I am confused, and therefore I can’t definitely prove anything :)
The idea of observer’s stability is fundamental for our understanding of reality (and also constantly supported by our experience) – any physical experiment assumes that the observer (or experimenter) remains the same during the experiment.
I agree that it’s useful in practice, to anticipate the experiences of the future you which you can actually influence the most. It makes life much more intuitive and simple, and is a practical fundamental assumption to make.
I don’t think it is “supported by our experience,” since if you experienced becoming someone else you wouldn’t actually know it happened, you would think you were them all along.
I admit that although it’s a subjective choice, it’s useful. It’s just that you’re allowed to anticipate becoming anyone else when you die or otherwise cease to have influence.
I can also use functional identity theory, where I care about the next steps of agents functionally similar to my current thought-line in logical time.
I think there is more to consider. For example, we can imagine a “qualia rainbow” theory of identity. I don’t necessarily endorse it, but it illustrates why understanding qualia is important for identity.
Imagine that infinitely many different qualia of “reds” could denote one real red. Each person, when born, is randomly initialized with a unique set of qualia for all colors and other sensations. This set can be called a “rainbow of qualia,” and continuous computing in the brain maintains it throughout a person’s life. A copy of me with a different set of qualia, though behaviorally indistinguishable, is not me. Only future mind states with the same set of qualia as mine are truly me, even if my memories were replaced with those of a rat.
Anthropic Trilemma is masterpiece.
Is the qualia rainbow theory a personal choice for deciding which copies to count as “me” and which copies to count as “not me?” Or does the theory say there is an objective flowchart in the universe, which dictates which future observer each observer shall experience becoming, and with what probabilities? If it was objective, could a set of red qualia be observed with a microscope?
I agree that qualia is an important topic (even if we don’t endorse the qualia rainbow theory), I agree that identity is complex, though I still strongly believe that which object contains my future identity is a very subjective choice by me.
The problem with the subjective choice view is that I can’t become Britney Spears. :) If I continue to sit at the table, I will find myself there every next moment even if I try to become someone else. So mapping into the next moments is an objective fact.
Moreover, even a single moment of experience is a mapping between two states of the brain, A and B. For example, moment A is before I see a rose, and moment B is after I see it and say: “A rose!” The experience of a red rose happens after A but before B.
The rainbow of qualia theory is objective but it assumes the existence of a hypothetical instrument: a qualiascope. A qualiascope is a mind which can connect to other minds and compare their experiences. This works the same way as my mind can compare qualia of colors and sounds without being any of them. Whether a qualiascope is physically possible is not obvious, as its observations may disturb the original qualia.
:) what proves that you “can’t become Britney Spears?” Suppose the very next moment, you become her (and she becomes you), but you lose all your memories and gain all of her memories.
As Britney Spears, you won’t be able to say “see, I tried to become Britney Spears, and now I am her,” because you won’t remember that memory of trying to become her. You’ll only remember her boring memories and act like her normal self. If you read on the internet that someone said they tried to become Britney Spears, you’ll laugh about it not realizing that that person used to be you.
Meanwhile if Britney Spears becomes you, she won’t be able to say “wow, I just became someone else.” Instead, she forgets all her memories and gains all your memories, including the memory of trying to become Britney Spears and apparently failing. She will write on the internet “see, I tried to become Britney Spears and it didn’t work,” not realizing that she used to be Britney Spears.
Did this event happen or not? There is no way to prove or disprove it, because in fact whether or not it happened not a valid question about the objective world. The universe has the exact same configuration of atoms in the case where it happened and in the case where it didn’t happen. And the configuration of atoms in the universe is all that exists.
The question of whether it happened or not only exists in your map, not the territory.
Haha but the truth is I don’t understand where “a single moment of experience” comes from. I’m itching to argue that there is no such thing as that either, and no objective measure of how much experience there is in any given object.
I can imagine a machine gradually changing one copy of me to two copies of me (gradually increasing the number causal events), and it feels totally subjective when the “copy count” increases from one to two.
But this indeed becomes paradoxical, since without an objective measure of experience, I cannot say that the copies of me who believe 1+1=2 have a “greater number” or “more weight” than the copies of me who believe 1+1=3. I have no way to explain why I happen to observe that 1+1=2 rather than 1+1=3, or why I’m in a universe where probability seems to follow the Born rule of quantum mechanics.
In the end I admit I am confused, and therefore I can’t definitely prove anything :)
The idea of observer’s stability is fundamental for our understanding of reality (and also constantly supported by our experience) – any physical experiment assumes that the observer (or experimenter) remains the same during the experiment.
I agree that it’s useful in practice, to anticipate the experiences of the future you which you can actually influence the most. It makes life much more intuitive and simple, and is a practical fundamental assumption to make.
I don’t think it is “supported by our experience,” since if you experienced becoming someone else you wouldn’t actually know it happened, you would think you were them all along.
I admit that although it’s a subjective choice, it’s useful. It’s just that you’re allowed to anticipate becoming anyone else when you die or otherwise cease to have influence.
I can also use functional identity theory, where I care about the next steps of agents functionally similar to my current thought-line in logical time.