I agree with this comment except for the last part:
...it’s important to point out how “God” isn’t a good answer to those questions, but I think it’s more important to point out the flawed thinking which leads to asking the questions in the first place.
I happen to think pointing out how “God” is a bad answer is actually more important.
Nonetheless, the other lesson—that the laws of physics do not necessarily have to carve up reality the way your brain wants to—is also important, and I think Eliezer exaggerates when he says that your answer is “every bit as terrible as the religious one”. As Sean Carroll puts it:
Modern physics doesn’t describe the world in terms of “causes” and “effects.” It simply posits that matter...acts in accordance with certain dynamical laws, known as “equations of motion.”… a concept like “cause” doesn’t appear anywhere in the equations of motion themselves, nor in the specification of the type of matter being described; it is only an occasionally-appropriate approximation, useful to us humans in narrating the behavior of some macroscopic configuration of equation-obeying matter.
Disagree with Sean Carroll. The property that Judea Pearl defines in “Causality” is a central part of the character of physical law.
I’d have to strongly disagree with that. It’s certainly why we’re interested in physical law, and how we test our understanding of physical law. But the central character of physical law admits no interventions when describing things at the lowest level.
The property that Judea Pearl defines in “Causality” is a central part of the character of physical law.
I may be hopelessly naive here, but can’t you explain the perception of “causality” by thermodynamics? Two uncorrelated thingies touching each other are likely to become correlated, thus giving the appearance that they have “influenced” each other.
I happen to think pointing out how “God” is a bad answer is actually more important.
That probably has more short-term importance for exposing theistic irrationality, but in the long-term, I think overcoming flawed thinking is more important for making progress.
I agree with this comment except for the last part:
I happen to think pointing out how “God” is a bad answer is actually more important.
Nonetheless, the other lesson—that the laws of physics do not necessarily have to carve up reality the way your brain wants to—is also important, and I think Eliezer exaggerates when he says that your answer is “every bit as terrible as the religious one”. As Sean Carroll puts it:
Disagree with Sean Carroll. The property that Judea Pearl defines in “Causality” is a central part of the character of physical law.
And even if what Sean Carroll said was true, there’d still be a big important problem to be resolved somehow.
It’s okay to have big outstanding problems. You don’t have to say “God” and you don’t have to sweep them under the rug either.
I’d have to strongly disagree with that. It’s certainly why we’re interested in physical law, and how we test our understanding of physical law. But the central character of physical law admits no interventions when describing things at the lowest level.
I may be hopelessly naive here, but can’t you explain the perception of “causality” by thermodynamics? Two uncorrelated thingies touching each other are likely to become correlated, thus giving the appearance that they have “influenced” each other.
That probably has more short-term importance for exposing theistic irrationality, but in the long-term, I think overcoming flawed thinking is more important for making progress.