For point 1, I can argue about how rational a decision theory is, but I cannot argue for “why I am this observer rather than that observer.” Not only am I unable to explain why I’m an observer who doesn’t see aliens, I am unable to explain why I am an observer believes 1+1=2, assuming there are infinite observers who believe 1+1=2 and infinite observers who believe 1+1=3. Anthropic reasoning becomes insanely hard and confusing and even Max Tegmark, Eliezer Yudkowsky and Nate Soares are confused.
Let’s just focus on point 2, since I’m much more hopeful I get get to the bottom of this one.
Of course I don’t believe in faster-than-light travel. I’m just saying that “being born as someone who sees old alien civilizations” and “being born as someone inside an old [alien] civilization” are technically the same, if you ignore the completely subjective and unnecessary distinction of “how much does the alien civilization need to influence me before I’m allowed to call myself a member of them?”
Suppose at level 0 influence, the alien civilization completely hides from you, and doesn’t let you see any of their activity.
At level 1.0 influence, the alien civilization doesn’t hide from you, and lets you look at their Dyson swarms or start lifting machines and all the fancy technologies.
At level 1.1 influence, they let you see their Dyson swarms, plus they send radio signals to us, sharing all their technologies and allowing us to immediately reach technological singularity. Very quickly, we build powerful molecular assemblers, allowing us to turn any instructions into physical objects, and we read instructions from the alien civilization allowing us to build a copy of their diplomats.
Some countries may be afraid to follow the radio instructions, but the instructions can easily be designed so that any country which refuses to follow the instructions will be quickly left behind.
At this point, there will be aliens on Earth, we’ll talk about life and everything, and we are in some sense members of their civilization.
At level 2.0 influence, the aliens physically arrive at Earth themselves, and observe our evolution, and introduce themselves.
At level 3.0 influence, the aliens physically arrive at Earth, and instead of observing our evolution (which is full of suffering and genocide and so forth), they intervene and directly create humans on Earth skipping the middle step, and we are born in the alien laboratory, and we talk to them and say hi.
At level 4.0 influence we are not only born in an alien laboratory, but we are aliens ourselves, completely born and raised in their society.
Now think about it. The Fermi Paradox is asking us why we aren’t born as individuals who experience level 1.0 influence. The Doomsday Argument is asking us why we aren’t born as individuals who experience level 4.0 influence (or arguably level 1.1 influence can count).
But honestly, there is no difference, from an epistemic view, between 1.0 influence and 4.0 influence. The two questions are ultimately the same: if most individuals exist inside the part of the light cone of an alien civilization (which they choose to influence), why aren’t we one of them?
Do you agree the two problems are epistemically the same?
if most individuals exist inside the part of the light cone of an alien civilization, why aren’t we one of them?
Then yes, 1.0 influence and 4.0 influence both count as “part of the light cone”, and so for the related anthropic arguments you could choose to group them together.
But re: anthropic arguments,
Not only am I unable to explain why I’m an observer who doesn’t see aliens
This is where I think I have a different perspective. Granting that anthropic arguments (here, about which observer you are and the odds of that) cause frustration and we don’t want to get into them, I think there is an actual reason why we don’t see aliens—maybe they aren’t there, maybe they’re hiding, maybe it’s all a simulation, whatever—and there’s no strong reason to assume we can’t discover that reason. So, in that non-anthropic sense, in a more scientific inquiry sense, it is possible to explain why I’m an observer who doesn’t see aliens. We just don’t know how to do that yet. The Great Filter is one possible explanation behind the “they aren’t there” answer, and this new information adjusts what we think the filters that would make up the Great Filter might be.
Another way to think about this: suppose we discover that actually science proves life should only arise on 1 in a googol planets. That introduces interesting anthropic considerations about how we ended up as observers on that 1 planet (can’t observe if you don’t exist, yadda yadda). But what I care about here is instead, what scientific discovery proved the odds should be so low? What exactly is the Great Filter that made us so rare?
Okay I guess we’re getting into the anthropic arguments then :/
So both the Fermi Paradox and the Doomsday Argument are asking, “assuming that the typical civilization lasts a very long time and has trillions of trillions of individuals inside the part of its lightcone it influences (either as members in the Doomsday Argument, or observers in the Fermi Paradox). Then why are we one of the first 100 billion individuals in our civilization?”
Before I try to answer it, I first want to point out that even if there was no answer, we should behave as if there was no Doomsday nor great filter. Because from a decision theory point of view, you don’t want your past self, in the first nanosecond of your life, to use the Doomsday Argument to prove he’s unlikely to live much longer than a nanosecond, and then spend all his resources in the first nanosecond.
For the actual answer, I only have theories.
One theory is this. “There are so many rocks in the universe, so why am I a human rather than a rock?” The answer is that rocks are not capable of thinking “why am I X rather than Y,” so given that you think such a thing, you cannot be a rock and have to be something intelligent like a human.
I may also ask you, “why, of all my millions of minutes of life, am I currently in the exact minute where I’m debating someone online about anthropic reasoning?” The answer might be similar to the rock answer: given you are thinking “why am I X rather than Y,” you’re probably in a debate etc. over anthropic reasoning.
If you stretch this form of reasoning to its limits, you may get the result that the only people asking “why am I one of the first 100 billion observers of my civilization,” are the people who are the first 100 billion observers.
This obviously feels very unsatisfactory. Yet we cannot explain why exactly this explanation feels unsatisfactory, while the previous two explanations feel satisfactory, so maybe it’s due to human biases that we reject the third argument by accept the first two.
Another theory is that you are indeed a simulation, but not the kind of simulation you think. How detailedly must a simulation simulate you, before the simulation contains a real observer, and you might actually exist inside the simulation? I argue, that the simulation only needs to be detailed enough such that your resulting thoughts and behaviours are accurate.
But merely human imagination, imagining a narrative, and knowing enough facts about the world to make it accurate, can actually simulate something accurately. Characters in a realistic story has similar thoughts and behaviours as real world humans, so they might just be simulations.
So people in the far future, who are not the first 100 billion observers of our civilization, but maybe the trillion trillionth observers, might be imagining our conversation play out, as an entertaining but realistic story, illustrating the strangeness of anthropic reasoning. As soon as the story finishes, we may cease to exist :/. In fact, as soon as I walk away from my computer, and I’m no longer talking about anthropic reasoning, I might stop existing and only exist again when I come back. But I won’t notice it happening, because such a story isn’t entertaining nor realistic if the characters actually observe glitches in the story simulation.
Or maybe they may be simply reading our conversation instead of writing it themselves, but reading it and imagining how it’s playing out still succeeds in simulating us.
Dangit I can’t cease to exist, I have stuff to do this weekend.
But more seriously, I don’t see the point you’re making? I don’t have a particular objection to your discussion of anthropic arguments, but also I don’t understand how it relates to the “what part of evolution/planetary science/sociology/etc. is the Great Filter” scientific question.
What I’m trying to argue is that there could easily be no Great Filter, and there could exist trillions of trillions of observers who live inside the light cone of an old alien civilization, whether directly as members of the civilization, or as observers who listen to their radio.
It’s just that we’re not one of them. We’re one of the first few observers who aren’t in such a light cone. Even though the observers inside such light cones outnumber us a trillion to one, we aren’t one of them.
:) if you insist on scientific explanations and dismiss anthropic explanations, then why doesn’t this work as an answer?
For point 1, I can argue about how rational a decision theory is, but I cannot argue for “why I am this observer rather than that observer.” Not only am I unable to explain why I’m an observer who doesn’t see aliens, I am unable to explain why I am an observer believes 1+1=2, assuming there are infinite observers who believe 1+1=2 and infinite observers who believe 1+1=3. Anthropic reasoning becomes insanely hard and confusing and even Max Tegmark, Eliezer Yudkowsky and Nate Soares are confused.
Let’s just focus on point 2, since I’m much more hopeful I get get to the bottom of this one.
Of course I don’t believe in faster-than-light travel. I’m just saying that “being born as someone who sees old alien civilizations” and “being born as someone inside an old [alien] civilization” are technically the same, if you ignore the completely subjective and unnecessary distinction of “how much does the alien civilization need to influence me before I’m allowed to call myself a member of them?”
Suppose at level 0 influence, the alien civilization completely hides from you, and doesn’t let you see any of their activity.
At level 1.0 influence, the alien civilization doesn’t hide from you, and lets you look at their Dyson swarms or start lifting machines and all the fancy technologies.
At level 1.1 influence, they let you see their Dyson swarms, plus they send radio signals to us, sharing all their technologies and allowing us to immediately reach technological singularity. Very quickly, we build powerful molecular assemblers, allowing us to turn any instructions into physical objects, and we read instructions from the alien civilization allowing us to build a copy of their diplomats.
Some countries may be afraid to follow the radio instructions, but the instructions can easily be designed so that any country which refuses to follow the instructions will be quickly left behind.
At this point, there will be aliens on Earth, we’ll talk about life and everything, and we are in some sense members of their civilization.
At level 2.0 influence, the aliens physically arrive at Earth themselves, and observe our evolution, and introduce themselves.
At level 3.0 influence, the aliens physically arrive at Earth, and instead of observing our evolution (which is full of suffering and genocide and so forth), they intervene and directly create humans on Earth skipping the middle step, and we are born in the alien laboratory, and we talk to them and say hi.
At level 4.0 influence we are not only born in an alien laboratory, but we are aliens ourselves, completely born and raised in their society.
Now think about it. The Fermi Paradox is asking us why we aren’t born as individuals who experience level 1.0 influence. The Doomsday Argument is asking us why we aren’t born as individuals who experience level 4.0 influence (or arguably level 1.1 influence can count).
But honestly, there is no difference, from an epistemic view, between 1.0 influence and 4.0 influence. The two questions are ultimately the same: if most individuals exist inside the part of the light cone of an alien civilization (which they choose to influence), why aren’t we one of them?
Do you agree the two problems are epistemically the same?
I think if you frame it as:
Then yes, 1.0 influence and 4.0 influence both count as “part of the light cone”, and so for the related anthropic arguments you could choose to group them together.
But re: anthropic arguments,
This is where I think I have a different perspective. Granting that anthropic arguments (here, about which observer you are and the odds of that) cause frustration and we don’t want to get into them, I think there is an actual reason why we don’t see aliens—maybe they aren’t there, maybe they’re hiding, maybe it’s all a simulation, whatever—and there’s no strong reason to assume we can’t discover that reason. So, in that non-anthropic sense, in a more scientific inquiry sense, it is possible to explain why I’m an observer who doesn’t see aliens. We just don’t know how to do that yet. The Great Filter is one possible explanation behind the “they aren’t there” answer, and this new information adjusts what we think the filters that would make up the Great Filter might be.
Another way to think about this: suppose we discover that actually science proves life should only arise on 1 in a googol planets. That introduces interesting anthropic considerations about how we ended up as observers on that 1 planet (can’t observe if you don’t exist, yadda yadda). But what I care about here is instead, what scientific discovery proved the odds should be so low? What exactly is the Great Filter that made us so rare?
Okay I guess we’re getting into the anthropic arguments then :/
So both the Fermi Paradox and the Doomsday Argument are asking, “assuming that the typical civilization lasts a very long time and has trillions of trillions of individuals inside the part of its lightcone it influences (either as members in the Doomsday Argument, or observers in the Fermi Paradox). Then why are we one of the first 100 billion individuals in our civilization?”
Before I try to answer it, I first want to point out that even if there was no answer, we should behave as if there was no Doomsday nor great filter. Because from a decision theory point of view, you don’t want your past self, in the first nanosecond of your life, to use the Doomsday Argument to prove he’s unlikely to live much longer than a nanosecond, and then spend all his resources in the first nanosecond.
For the actual answer, I only have theories.
One theory is this. “There are so many rocks in the universe, so why am I a human rather than a rock?” The answer is that rocks are not capable of thinking “why am I X rather than Y,” so given that you think such a thing, you cannot be a rock and have to be something intelligent like a human.
I may also ask you, “why, of all my millions of minutes of life, am I currently in the exact minute where I’m debating someone online about anthropic reasoning?” The answer might be similar to the rock answer: given you are thinking “why am I X rather than Y,” you’re probably in a debate etc. over anthropic reasoning.
If you stretch this form of reasoning to its limits, you may get the result that the only people asking “why am I one of the first 100 billion observers of my civilization,” are the people who are the first 100 billion observers.
This obviously feels very unsatisfactory. Yet we cannot explain why exactly this explanation feels unsatisfactory, while the previous two explanations feel satisfactory, so maybe it’s due to human biases that we reject the third argument by accept the first two.
Another theory is that you are indeed a simulation, but not the kind of simulation you think. How detailedly must a simulation simulate you, before the simulation contains a real observer, and you might actually exist inside the simulation? I argue, that the simulation only needs to be detailed enough such that your resulting thoughts and behaviours are accurate.
But merely human imagination, imagining a narrative, and knowing enough facts about the world to make it accurate, can actually simulate something accurately. Characters in a realistic story has similar thoughts and behaviours as real world humans, so they might just be simulations.
So people in the far future, who are not the first 100 billion observers of our civilization, but maybe the trillion trillionth observers, might be imagining our conversation play out, as an entertaining but realistic story, illustrating the strangeness of anthropic reasoning. As soon as the story finishes, we may cease to exist :/. In fact, as soon as I walk away from my computer, and I’m no longer talking about anthropic reasoning, I might stop existing and only exist again when I come back. But I won’t notice it happening, because such a story isn’t entertaining nor realistic if the characters actually observe glitches in the story simulation.
Or maybe they may be simply reading our conversation instead of writing it themselves, but reading it and imagining how it’s playing out still succeeds in simulating us.
Dangit I can’t cease to exist, I have stuff to do this weekend.
But more seriously, I don’t see the point you’re making? I don’t have a particular objection to your discussion of anthropic arguments, but also I don’t understand how it relates to the “what part of evolution/planetary science/sociology/etc. is the Great Filter” scientific question.
What I’m trying to argue is that there could easily be no Great Filter, and there could exist trillions of trillions of observers who live inside the light cone of an old alien civilization, whether directly as members of the civilization, or as observers who listen to their radio.
It’s just that we’re not one of them. We’re one of the first few observers who aren’t in such a light cone. Even though the observers inside such light cones outnumber us a trillion to one, we aren’t one of them.
:) if you insist on scientific explanations and dismiss anthropic explanations, then why doesn’t this work as an answer?
Oh okay. I agree it’s possible there’s no Great Filter.