Under typical game-theoretic assumptions, we would assume all players to be strategic. In that context, it seems much more natural to suppose that all evil people would also be liars.
For me, the main point of the post is that you can’t simultaneously (1) buy the picture in which the meaning of a signal is what it probabilistically implies, and (2) have a sensible definition of “lying”. So when you say “2% are evil liars”, Zack’s response could be something like, “what do you mean by that?”—you’re already assuming that words mean things independent of what they signal, which is the assumption Zack is calling out here (on my reading).
Under typical game-theoretic assumptions, we would assume all players to be strategic. In that context, it seems much more natural to suppose that all evil people would also be liars.
Why? Maybe some evil people are ok with kicking puppies but not with lying—that’s part of their utility function. (If such differences in utility functions can’t exist, then there’s no such thing as “good” or “evil” anyway.)
Under typical game-theoretic assumptions, we would assume all players to be strategic. In that context, it seems much more natural to suppose that all evil people would also be liars.
For me, the main point of the post is that you can’t simultaneously (1) buy the picture in which the meaning of a signal is what it probabilistically implies, and (2) have a sensible definition of “lying”. So when you say “2% are evil liars”, Zack’s response could be something like, “what do you mean by that?”—you’re already assuming that words mean things independent of what they signal, which is the assumption Zack is calling out here (on my reading).
Why? Maybe some evil people are ok with kicking puppies but not with lying—that’s part of their utility function. (If such differences in utility functions can’t exist, then there’s no such thing as “good” or “evil” anyway.)