To whom is the criticism directed? Should the matching provider not be allowed to put whatever chrome they want over their donation? Should the charity not advertise that there is a match?
I strongly agree that any leverage from matching is illusory—the pledged match amount is going to the charity regardless. It probably has a small effect on donors, making them more likely to donate if there’s a match offer than not. (an exception is employer matching where the same amount gets donated, but participant choices determine where it goes).
I think this applies to your proposal as well—it doesn’t cause more gifting, and it doesn’t get more money to the preferred (by weight of donation) destination. It’s just complexity for no value over “shut up and donate to the charity(-ies) you support. I think if you do the math (including any preferences or indifference on behalf of both the matcher and the matchees), you’ll find that it pretty much works out to a wash for any system which doesn’t violate a preference.
To whom is the criticism directed? Should the matching provider not be allowed to put whatever chrome they want over their donation? Should the charity not advertise that there is a match?
I strongly agree that any leverage from matching is illusory—the pledged match amount is going to the charity regardless. It probably has a small effect on donors, making them more likely to donate if there’s a match offer than not. (an exception is employer matching where the same amount gets donated, but participant choices determine where it goes).
I think this applies to your proposal as well—it doesn’t cause more gifting, and it doesn’t get more money to the preferred (by weight of donation) destination. It’s just complexity for no value over “shut up and donate to the charity(-ies) you support. I think if you do the math (including any preferences or indifference on behalf of both the matcher and the matchees), you’ll find that it pretty much works out to a wash for any system which doesn’t violate a preference.