The lesson I drew from Israel vs Iran is that stealth just hard-counters drones in a peer conflict. The essential insight is that guided bombs aren’t just similar to small suicide drones, they are drones- with all the advantages- as long as you can get a platform in place to drop them
I think stealth hard counters a technologically backward opponent like Iran. If one’s opponent has very few or very old sensor systems, then stealth can grant the ability to just fly over someone and drop bombs on them, which is pretty great, because bombs are cheap.
But in (say) a peer US-China conflict, drones are also sensing platforms.
In a potential conflict with China, China will have sensors on numerous (non-electric) unmanned drones, on submarine drones, on high-powered manned aircraft further back, on their satellites, all along their coastline and so on. They’ve had decades to prepare while stealth was the obvious number one American strategy; this is a very-well considered response. “Stealth” becomes a much more relative term; the advantage almost certainly looks more like, “Well, we can get N% closer before they see us” than anything transformational.
Anyhow, in a peer conflict, due to all the above, I expect even relatively stealthy US platforms like the B-21 to be using their stealth to haul LRASMs just a little closer before dropping them off; and even with conservative deployment like that, I expect notable losses.
If the US actually tries to drop bombs with them I expect very high losses (in the timeframe of days / weeks) that the US will be completely unable to sustain over time.
It’s worth noting that Israel’s strikes on Iran also involved using their special forces to disable Iranian air defense, using special forces and—of course—drones. So Iran’s already-inferior defense against Israeli bombers was already notably degraded before overflights.
And if anyone’s striking anyone with drones in an unexpected way in a peer conflict, it’s not gonna necessarily be the US doing the striking. Ukraine destroyed a few hundred million dollars of Russian bomber hardware by smuggling a handful of cheap-ass drones into Russia; is China or the US going to have an easier time doing a similar feat? Are anyone’s current air bases well protected to this? Whose airbases have more hardened shelters that prevent such cheap attacks?
A couple notes: israel and russia are extremely comparable in military spending, likewise Ukraine and Iran. In addition, Ukraine and Iran both went hard into drones to counter the disparity, its very noticable that drones basically work against Russia and basically don’t against Israel- but neither conflict provides dramatically more evidence than the other about a war where both sides are well-resourced and nuclear. In particular, the lack of drone based attrition of the israeli airforce is glaring.
Also, I agree that Israel made great use of drones to take out anti-air defenses. However, this use of drones in no way requires manufacturing millions of quadcopters.
The lesson I drew from Israel vs Iran is that stealth just hard-counters drones in a peer conflict. The essential insight is that guided bombs aren’t just similar to small suicide drones, they are drones- with all the advantages- as long as you can get a platform in place to drop them
I think stealth hard counters a technologically backward opponent like Iran. If one’s opponent has very few or very old sensor systems, then stealth can grant the ability to just fly over someone and drop bombs on them, which is pretty great, because bombs are cheap.
But in (say) a peer US-China conflict, drones are also sensing platforms.
In a potential conflict with China, China will have sensors on numerous (non-electric) unmanned drones, on submarine drones, on high-powered manned aircraft further back, on their satellites, all along their coastline and so on. They’ve had decades to prepare while stealth was the obvious number one American strategy; this is a very-well considered response. “Stealth” becomes a much more relative term; the advantage almost certainly looks more like, “Well, we can get N% closer before they see us” than anything transformational.
Anyhow, in a peer conflict, due to all the above, I expect even relatively stealthy US platforms like the B-21 to be using their stealth to haul LRASMs just a little closer before dropping them off; and even with conservative deployment like that, I expect notable losses.
If the US actually tries to drop bombs with them I expect very high losses (in the timeframe of days / weeks) that the US will be completely unable to sustain over time.
It’s worth noting that Israel’s strikes on Iran also involved using their special forces to disable Iranian air defense, using special forces and—of course—drones. So Iran’s already-inferior defense against Israeli bombers was already notably degraded before overflights.
And if anyone’s striking anyone with drones in an unexpected way in a peer conflict, it’s not gonna necessarily be the US doing the striking. Ukraine destroyed a few hundred million dollars of Russian bomber hardware by smuggling a handful of cheap-ass drones into Russia; is China or the US going to have an easier time doing a similar feat? Are anyone’s current air bases well protected to this? Whose airbases have more hardened shelters that prevent such cheap attacks?
A couple notes: israel and russia are extremely comparable in military spending, likewise Ukraine and Iran. In addition, Ukraine and Iran both went hard into drones to counter the disparity, its very noticable that drones basically work against Russia and basically don’t against Israel- but neither conflict provides dramatically more evidence than the other about a war where both sides are well-resourced and nuclear. In particular, the lack of drone based attrition of the israeli airforce is glaring.
Also, I agree that Israel made great use of drones to take out anti-air defenses. However, this use of drones in no way requires manufacturing millions of quadcopters.