In the instrumental reading of “should”, rational behavior should promote use of good cognitive algorithms. It’s a bit inflationary to label any behavior that is not directly a habit of cognition “rational”, but if anything is to be labeled that way, it’s the things that lead to more systematic use of rational habits of cognition. This is in contrast to beliefs and actions merely generated as a result of using rational habits of cognition, calling those “rational” is obscenely inflationary.
I’m not sure why an instrumental reading of “should” would result in “should” not about being creating obligations. In my experience most of the time where people use the word should and then say that they aren’t speaking about obligations, they aren’t really clear about what they are saying.
In the case of the OP I expect that he thinks about whether there’s an obligation to exercise.
Most concepts can be thought of as purposes, inducing normativity over things in the vicinity of the concept, pointing them in the direction of becoming more central examples of it. So a sphere shouldn’t have bumps on it, and a guillotine should be sharp. There is usually equivocation with the shouldness of human values because many concepts are selected for being benign, including concepts for useful designs like cars and chairs, but the sense that emphasizes the purpose of a particular concept is more specific. This way rationality the concept is a property of ingredients of cognition, while rationality the purpose advises how ingredients of cognition should change to become more rational. This is the sense of being instrumental I meant, instrumental to fitting a concept better.
The idea of concepts as purposes is relevant to non-agentic behavior, where the emphasis is on coexistence of multiple purposes, not one preference, and for continued operation of specific agent designs, including rational human cognition, where parts of the design should keep to their purpose and resist corruption from consequentialist considerations, like with beliefs chosen by appeal to consequences or breaking of moral principles for the greater good.
Rationality is not about “should”. It’s no value system.
In the instrumental reading of “should”, rational behavior should promote use of good cognitive algorithms. It’s a bit inflationary to label any behavior that is not directly a habit of cognition “rational”, but if anything is to be labeled that way, it’s the things that lead to more systematic use of rational habits of cognition. This is in contrast to beliefs and actions merely generated as a result of using rational habits of cognition, calling those “rational” is obscenely inflationary.
I’m not sure why an instrumental reading of “should” would result in “should” not about being creating obligations. In my experience most of the time where people use the word should and then say that they aren’t speaking about obligations, they aren’t really clear about what they are saying.
In the case of the OP I expect that he thinks about whether there’s an obligation to exercise.
Most concepts can be thought of as purposes, inducing normativity over things in the vicinity of the concept, pointing them in the direction of becoming more central examples of it. So a sphere shouldn’t have bumps on it, and a guillotine should be sharp. There is usually equivocation with the shouldness of human values because many concepts are selected for being benign, including concepts for useful designs like cars and chairs, but the sense that emphasizes the purpose of a particular concept is more specific. This way rationality the concept is a property of ingredients of cognition, while rationality the purpose advises how ingredients of cognition should change to become more rational. This is the sense of being instrumental I meant, instrumental to fitting a concept better.
The idea of concepts as purposes is relevant to non-agentic behavior, where the emphasis is on coexistence of multiple purposes, not one preference, and for continued operation of specific agent designs, including rational human cognition, where parts of the design should keep to their purpose and resist corruption from consequentialist considerations, like with beliefs chosen by appeal to consequences or breaking of moral principles for the greater good.