I disagree with you in the fact that there is a potential large upside if Putin can make the West/NATO withdraw their almost unconditional support to Ukraine and even larger if he can put a wedge in the alliance somehow. It’s a high risk path for him to walk down that line, but he could walk it if he is forced: this is why most experts are talking about “leaving him a way out”/”don’t force him in the corner”. It’s also the strategy the West is pursuing, as we haven’t given Ukraine weapons that would enable them to strike deep into Russian territory.
I am also very concerned that the nuclear game theory would break down during an actual conflict as it is not just between the US and Russia but between many parties, each with their own government. Moreover, Article 5 binds a response for any action against a NATO state but doesn’t bind a nuclear response vs a nuclear attack. I could see a situation where Russia threatens with nukes a NATO territory of a non-nuclear NATO state if the West doesn’t back down and the US/France/UK don’t commit to a nuclear strike to answer it, but just a conventional one, in fear of a nuclear strike on their own territory. In fact, it is under Putin himself that Russia’s nuclear strategy apparently shifted to “escalate-to-deescalate”, which it’s exactly the situation we might end up in.
Fundamentally, the West leaders would have to play game of chicken with a non-moral restrained adversary that that they do not know the complete sanity of.
From what I have read, and how much nuclear experts are concerned, I am thinking that the chances of Putin using a nuclear warhead in Ukraine over the course of the war is around 25%. Conditional on that happening, total nuclear war breaking out is probably less than 10%, as I see much more likely the West folding/deescalating.
Reading this makes me think that it might be inconsistent to think that both Putin won’t use nukes for fear of escalating to nuclear war, and that the west will avoid escalating to nuclear war in the case that Putin does deploy a nuke. Of course both sides want to project strength and ensure that there is significant uncertainty around the actions they will take, but we probably can’t be highly confident in both.
The reason, of course, is that if Putin were highly confident that the west would not escalate all the way to nuke war, then he would not feel deterred in using nuclear weapons.
I still think that there’s not really a tactical use for the weapons, which is an independent reason to not use them.
I do agree that game theory is much less clear in multiparty games, and that there’s a lot of complexity on the ground. On the other hand, the US has ~all the nukes that Putin cares about, so in that sense it’s much less complex.
I disagree with you in the fact that there is a potential large upside if Putin can make the West/NATO withdraw their almost unconditional support to Ukraine and even larger if he can put a wedge in the alliance somehow. It’s a high risk path for him to walk down that line, but he could walk it if he is forced: this is why most experts are talking about “leaving him a way out”/”don’t force him in the corner”. It’s also the strategy the West is pursuing, as we haven’t given Ukraine weapons that would enable them to strike deep into Russian territory.
I am also very concerned that the nuclear game theory would break down during an actual conflict as it is not just between the US and Russia but between many parties, each with their own government. Moreover, Article 5 binds a response for any action against a NATO state but doesn’t bind a nuclear response vs a nuclear attack. I could see a situation where Russia threatens with nukes a NATO territory of a non-nuclear NATO state if the West doesn’t back down and the US/France/UK don’t commit to a nuclear strike to answer it, but just a conventional one, in fear of a nuclear strike on their own territory. In fact, it is under Putin himself that Russia’s nuclear strategy apparently shifted to “escalate-to-deescalate”, which it’s exactly the situation we might end up in.
Fundamentally, the West leaders would have to play game of chicken with a non-moral restrained adversary that that they do not know the complete sanity of.
From what I have read, and how much nuclear experts are concerned, I am thinking that the chances of Putin using a nuclear warhead in Ukraine over the course of the war is around 25%. Conditional on that happening, total nuclear war breaking out is probably less than 10%, as I see much more likely the West folding/deescalating.
Reading this makes me think that it might be inconsistent to think that both Putin won’t use nukes for fear of escalating to nuclear war, and that the west will avoid escalating to nuclear war in the case that Putin does deploy a nuke. Of course both sides want to project strength and ensure that there is significant uncertainty around the actions they will take, but we probably can’t be highly confident in both.
The reason, of course, is that if Putin were highly confident that the west would not escalate all the way to nuke war, then he would not feel deterred in using nuclear weapons.
I still think that there’s not really a tactical use for the weapons, which is an independent reason to not use them.
I do agree that game theory is much less clear in multiparty games, and that there’s a lot of complexity on the ground. On the other hand, the US has ~all the nukes that Putin cares about, so in that sense it’s much less complex.