I am not an economist, so it’s hard to me to judge the quality of the paper. In fact, I was just trying to show the kind of argument made for bank independence at the time. Feel free to check the paper for yourself: https://debis.deu.edu.tr/userweb//yesim.kustepeli/dosyalar/alesinasummers1993.pdf Section 2. is about measuring the central bank independence.
It seems to cite among others Bade and Parkin’s Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy from 1982.
When it discusses Italy where shareholders have the right of proposing candidates and the government needs to approve them, it judges the government as having complete control.
In Germany where the Federal government appoints some members and the Bundesrat (body of the state governments) appoint others they judge the system as a self-perpetuating oligarchy. To the extend that they are it’s because the job they are doing is valued by the ruling parties in Germany so they listen to their recommendations about who to appoint.
I am not an economist, so it’s hard to me to judge the quality of the paper. In fact, I was just trying to show the kind of argument made for bank independence at the time. Feel free to check the paper for yourself: https://debis.deu.edu.tr/userweb//yesim.kustepeli/dosyalar/alesinasummers1993.pdf Section 2. is about measuring the central bank independence.
It seems to cite among others Bade and Parkin’s Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy from 1982.
When it discusses Italy where shareholders have the right of proposing candidates and the government needs to approve them, it judges the government as having complete control.
In Germany where the Federal government appoints some members and the Bundesrat (body of the state governments) appoint others they judge the system as a self-perpetuating oligarchy. To the extend that they are it’s because the job they are doing is valued by the ruling parties in Germany so they listen to their recommendations about who to appoint.