Illusionists, like Dennett and Frankish, argue that this datum is itself a product of cognitive architecture: consciousness only seems irreducible because our introspective systems misrepresent their own operations.3
Also...there is no reduction..in the sense in the sense of a theory that can predict qualia .. and predicting them as illusions isn’t much different. The
Irreducubility and ineffability aren’t just immediately given seemings.
The “hard problem” dissolves once we recognize that the inner glow is how self-modeling appears from the inside
Some generic “inner glow” is different to qualia, what the Hard Problem is about.
The demand for an inner witness (“something must be experiencing something”) leads inexorably to regress
Maybe, but an inner witness isn’t the same thing as, qualia, either.
Also...there is no reduction..in the sense in the sense of a theory that can predict qualia .. and predicting them as illusions isn’t much different. The
Irreducubility and ineffability aren’t just immediately given seemings.
Some generic “inner glow” is different to qualia, what the Hard Problem is about.
Maybe, but an inner witness isn’t the same thing as, qualia, either.