Please see the section entitled “This essay is not very skimmable”
I had seen that warning, and was trying to keep track of the distinction, but apparently still failed. To check my understanding now:
cosmic Schelling answers are hypothetical answers in thought experiments where we assume that everyone is trying to converge to the same answers on the same questions
cosmic Schelling norms are just a subset of cosmic Schelling answers (“to a pro tanto moral question”), and therefore not necessarily actual norms in the dictionary sense of “a principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behavior”
In other words, the cosmic Schelling norm of an arbitrary pro tanto moral question probably exists in platonic space, but in most cases this would not be an actual norm in reality because (among other potential reasons) most beings in the cosmos would not actually be trying to converge on this particular question. Is this correct?
(If so, I’m confused how this usage of “norm” squares with your position as a compositional language realist, since compositionally it seems like a statement of the form “X is a cosmic Schelling norm” should imply that X is a norm?)
cosmic Schelling answers are hypothetical answers in thought experiments where we assume that everyone is trying to converge to the same answers on the same questions
Not quite. As I intend it: cosmic Schelling answers are real answers to real questions about hypothetical scenarios in which everyone is trying to give the same answer to that real question.
I’m already thinking about how I could have made this more clear in the essay, so thank you for pressing on it for clarity. I was trying to say this, but not as clearly, when I wrote in the first paragraph that claims of cosmic Schelling goodness are “claims about a class of hypothetical coordination games in the sense of Thomas Schelling”. The claims are made in reality by real agents (like me!), but the claims are about hypothetical scenarios where everyone is trying to give the same answer.
cosmic Schelling norms are just a subset of cosmic Schelling answers (“to a pro tanto moral question”)
Yep that is what I mean!
and therefore not necessarily actual norms in the dictionary sense of “a principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behavior”
I disagree with the “therefore not” here. Some norms have few adherents, and some have more. In computer science and math, the empty set is a set, and I think it makes sense to talk about a statement of type “norm” that might have effectively zero adherents, like “It’s good to ingest 3g of uranium mixed with applesauce on Tuesdays at 3:05pm”. That’s a norm that nobody follows, at least not on pre-2026 Earth before I wrote that sentence.
So I think cosmic Schelling norms are norms; they are statements of type “norm”.
But a cosmic Schelling norm is not necessarily a cosmically prevalent norm, in the sense of prevailing strongly over other pressures on behavior throughout the cosmos. Perhaps this is what you were pointing at when you said they are “not really norms”. Certainly, the central examples of “norms” that people think of are the prevalent ones, where the group of beings in some sense “bound” by the norm is substantial or relevant.
Still, even in a real human community, a norm can be broadly recognized as Schelling while not prevailing. Where I grew up, there were communities where “premarital sex is bad” was definitely the Schelling answer to “is premarital sex good or bad”: if you asked it on a survey and told people to pick the same answer as everyone else, they’d pick “bad” and be confident they were winning the Schelling survey game. Yet this was not a prevalent norm: most of the people were in fact having premarital sex. The norm did not prevail over other priorities, despite being Schelling and recognizably so amongst the group members.
That said, I’m pretty sure essentially every cosmic Schelling norm has some adherents, if only few.
your position as a compositional language realist
I’m quite pleased you saw this tweet and feel deeply understood by you mentioning it, as it absolutely applies here :)
Because metaethics considers spaces of norms, I’m using “norm” as a type, with some norms possibly having no adherents. So, “stealing is bad” is a norm, and “stealing is good” is also a norm, albeit with fewer adherents. Exactly one of those two norms is the cosmic Schelling norm regarding stealing, unless there is an exact 50⁄50 tie between the two, which seems extremely unlikely to me.
I think this usage fits with what it means to be “a” norm, and fits with other cases of conflict between norms, like “it’s good for women to vote” and “it’s bad for women to vote”, both of which are norms that have had non-zero support at various times and places in human history.
Given this usage, does it makes sense to you now how the following four sets of beings can be different?
those beings who say “stealing is bad” is a cosmic Schelling norm, i.e. the cosmic Schelling answer to “Is stealing good or bad?”;
those beings who know with high confidence that “stealing is bad” is a cosmic Schelling norm (i.e., know that it’s the most common answer to the cosmic Schelling question of “Is stealing good or bad?”);
those beings who endorse “stealing is bad” being the cosmic Schelling norm; and
those beings who adhere to that norm to some degree, i.e., make some non-negligible general effort to avoid stealing, as opposed to the opposite.
I think if you can see the difference between those four sets, and how I am using “norm” as a type that defines a space of competing possibilities including both “stealing is bad” and “stealing is good”, then it should help clear some things up.
I’m still not very sure what you meant by “actual norm in reality”, if you didn’t mean “actually prevalent norm throughout the cosmos”, so LMK if I missed the point there.
I had seen that warning, and was trying to keep track of the distinction, but apparently still failed. To check my understanding now:
cosmic Schelling answers are hypothetical answers in thought experiments where we assume that everyone is trying to converge to the same answers on the same questions
cosmic Schelling norms are just a subset of cosmic Schelling answers (“to a pro tanto moral question”), and therefore not necessarily actual norms in the dictionary sense of “a principle of right action binding upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable behavior”
In other words, the cosmic Schelling norm of an arbitrary pro tanto moral question probably exists in platonic space, but in most cases this would not be an actual norm in reality because (among other potential reasons) most beings in the cosmos would not actually be trying to converge on this particular question. Is this correct?
(If so, I’m confused how this usage of “norm” squares with your position as a compositional language realist, since compositionally it seems like a statement of the form “X is a cosmic Schelling norm” should imply that X is a norm?)
Not quite. As I intend it: cosmic Schelling answers are real answers to real questions about hypothetical scenarios in which everyone is trying to give the same answer to that real question.
I’m already thinking about how I could have made this more clear in the essay, so thank you for pressing on it for clarity. I was trying to say this, but not as clearly, when I wrote in the first paragraph that claims of cosmic Schelling goodness are “claims about a class of hypothetical coordination games in the sense of Thomas Schelling”. The claims are made in reality by real agents (like me!), but the claims are about hypothetical scenarios where everyone is trying to give the same answer.
Yep that is what I mean!
I disagree with the “therefore not” here. Some norms have few adherents, and some have more. In computer science and math, the empty set is a set, and I think it makes sense to talk about a statement of type “norm” that might have effectively zero adherents, like “It’s good to ingest 3g of uranium mixed with applesauce on Tuesdays at 3:05pm”. That’s a norm that nobody follows, at least not on pre-2026 Earth before I wrote that sentence.
So I think cosmic Schelling norms are norms; they are statements of type “norm”.
But a cosmic Schelling norm is not necessarily a cosmically prevalent norm, in the sense of prevailing strongly over other pressures on behavior throughout the cosmos. Perhaps this is what you were pointing at when you said they are “not really norms”. Certainly, the central examples of “norms” that people think of are the prevalent ones, where the group of beings in some sense “bound” by the norm is substantial or relevant.
Still, even in a real human community, a norm can be broadly recognized as Schelling while not prevailing. Where I grew up, there were communities where “premarital sex is bad” was definitely the Schelling answer to “is premarital sex good or bad”: if you asked it on a survey and told people to pick the same answer as everyone else, they’d pick “bad” and be confident they were winning the Schelling survey game. Yet this was not a prevalent norm: most of the people were in fact having premarital sex. The norm did not prevail over other priorities, despite being Schelling and recognizably so amongst the group members.
That said, I’m pretty sure essentially every cosmic Schelling norm has some adherents, if only few.
I’m quite pleased you saw this tweet and feel deeply understood by you mentioning it, as it absolutely applies here :)
Because metaethics considers spaces of norms, I’m using “norm” as a type, with some norms possibly having no adherents. So, “stealing is bad” is a norm, and “stealing is good” is also a norm, albeit with fewer adherents. Exactly one of those two norms is the cosmic Schelling norm regarding stealing, unless there is an exact 50⁄50 tie between the two, which seems extremely unlikely to me.
I think this usage fits with what it means to be “a” norm, and fits with other cases of conflict between norms, like “it’s good for women to vote” and “it’s bad for women to vote”, both of which are norms that have had non-zero support at various times and places in human history.
Given this usage, does it makes sense to you now how the following four sets of beings can be different?
those beings who say “stealing is bad” is a cosmic Schelling norm, i.e. the cosmic Schelling answer to “Is stealing good or bad?”;
those beings who know with high confidence that “stealing is bad” is a cosmic Schelling norm (i.e., know that it’s the most common answer to the cosmic Schelling question of “Is stealing good or bad?”);
those beings who endorse “stealing is bad” being the cosmic Schelling norm; and
those beings who adhere to that norm to some degree, i.e., make some non-negligible general effort to avoid stealing, as opposed to the opposite.
I think if you can see the difference between those four sets, and how I am using “norm” as a type that defines a space of competing possibilities including both “stealing is bad” and “stealing is good”, then it should help clear some things up.
I’m still not very sure what you meant by “actual norm in reality”, if you didn’t mean “actually prevalent norm throughout the cosmos”, so LMK if I missed the point there.