Sorry, I said twin case, I meant the procreation case!
The simulation case seems relevantly like the normal twin case which I’m not as sure about.
Legible precommitment is not crazy! Sometimes, it is rational to agree to do the irrational thing in some case. If you have the ability to make it so that you won’t later change your mind, you should do that. But once you’re in that situation, it makes sense to defect.
As far as I can tell, the procreation case isn’t defined well enough in Schwarz for me to enage with it. In particular, in what exact way are the decision of my father and I entangled? (Just saying the father follows FDT isn’t enough.) But, I do think there is going to be a case basically like this where I bite the bullet here. Noteably, so does EDT.
That would mean that believed he had a father with the same reasons, who believed he had a father with the same reasons, who believed he had a father with the same reasons...
I.e., this would require an infinite line of forefathers. (Or at least of hypothetical, believed-in forefathers.)
If anywhere there’s a break in the chain — that person would not have FDT reasons to reproduce, so neither would their son, etc.
Which makes it disanalogous from any cases we encounter in real life. And makes me more sympathetic to the FDT reasoning, since it’s a stranger case where I have less strong pre-existing intuitions.
...which makes the Procreation case an unfair problem. It punishes FDT’ers specifically for following FDT. If we’re going to punish decision theories for their identity, no decision theory is safe. It’s pretty wild to me that @WolfgangSchwarz either didn’t notice this or doesn’t think it’s a problem.
A more fair version of Procreation would be what I have called Procreation*, where your father follows the same decision theory as you (be it FDT, CDT or whatever).
Cool, so you maybe agree that CDT agents would want to self modify into something like FDT agents (if they could). Then I suppose we might just disagree on the semantics behind the word rational.
(Note that CDT agents don’t exactly self-modify into FDT agents, just something close.)
Sorry, I said twin case, I meant the procreation case!
The simulation case seems relevantly like the normal twin case which I’m not as sure about.
Legible precommitment is not crazy! Sometimes, it is rational to agree to do the irrational thing in some case. If you have the ability to make it so that you won’t later change your mind, you should do that. But once you’re in that situation, it makes sense to defect.
As far as I can tell, the procreation case isn’t defined well enough in Schwarz for me to enage with it. In particular, in what exact way are the decision of my father and I entangled? (Just saying the father follows FDT isn’t enough.) But, I do think there is going to be a case basically like this where I bite the bullet here. Noteably, so does EDT.
Your father followed FDT and had the same reasons to procreate as you. He is relevantly like you.
That would mean that believed he had a father with the same reasons, who believed he had a father with the same reasons, who believed he had a father with the same reasons...
I.e., this would require an infinite line of forefathers. (Or at least of hypothetical, believed-in forefathers.)
If anywhere there’s a break in the chain — that person would not have FDT reasons to reproduce, so neither would their son, etc.
Which makes it disanalogous from any cases we encounter in real life. And makes me more sympathetic to the FDT reasoning, since it’s a stranger case where I have less strong pre-existing intuitions.
...which makes the Procreation case an unfair problem. It punishes FDT’ers specifically for following FDT. If we’re going to punish decision theories for their identity, no decision theory is safe. It’s pretty wild to me that @WolfgangSchwarz either didn’t notice this or doesn’t think it’s a problem.
A more fair version of Procreation would be what I have called Procreation*, where your father follows the same decision theory as you (be it FDT, CDT or whatever).
Cool, so you maybe agree that CDT agents would want to self modify into something like FDT agents (if they could). Then I suppose we might just disagree on the semantics behind the word rational.
(Note that CDT agents don’t exactly self-modify into FDT agents, just something close.)