The compatibilist concept of free will is practical. It tells you under which circumstances someone can be held legally or ethically responsible. It does not require global additions about how the laws of the universe work. Only when compatibilist free will is asserted as being the only kind does it become a metaphysical claim, or rather an anti metaphysical one. The existence of compatibilist free will isn’t worth arguing about: it’s designed to be compatible with a wide variety of background assumptions.
Magical, or “counter causal” free will is designed to be absurd and impossible from the outset, and therefore is not worth worrying about either. (Incidentally, no proponent of libertarianism ever uses the term “counter causal”)
What is worth worrying about is broadly naturalistic libertarian free will. That is, a conception of free will that, unlike compatibilist has some defeasible requirements, such as indeterministic laws of physics, but only requirements which are logically and physically possible. The middle ground is where the action is. (Note that the magical notion of free will is often accused of needing some fundamental third alternative to determinism and chance, whereas naturalistic libertarian ism only requires a mixture of the two structure d in a certain way
The compatibilist concept of free will is practical.
Yep, no qualms there. it is definitely the pragmatic approach that works in the usual circumstances. The problem arise when you start exploring farther from the mainstream, where your intuition fails, like the Newcomb’s problem.
Perhaps I shoukd have bern clearer that complete determinism versus indeterminism is an open question in science . But then maybe you knew, because your you made a few references to indeterminism already.
And maybe you knew because the issue is crucial to the the correct interpration of QM , which is discussed interminably here.
There is no difference between determinism and chance in that sense,
You hint very briefly at the he idea that randomness doesn’t support libertarian FW, but that is an open question in philosophy. It has been given book-length treatments.
Scott Aaronson suggested the Knightian free bit option as a source of true unpredictability, which seems to be an inherent requirement for the libertarian free will not based on magic
Which? Is indeterminism incapable of supporting FW as stated in the first quote , or capable as in the second?
But that is slightly beside the point, since our are arguing against counterfactuals, and the existence of counterfactuals follows tatologously from the absence of strict determinism, questions of free will aside
The compatibilist concept of free will is practical. It tells you under which circumstances someone can be held legally or ethically responsible. It does not require global additions about how the laws of the universe work. Only when compatibilist free will is asserted as being the only kind does it become a metaphysical claim, or rather an anti metaphysical one. The existence of compatibilist free will isn’t worth arguing about: it’s designed to be compatible with a wide variety of background assumptions.
Magical, or “counter causal” free will is designed to be absurd and impossible from the outset, and therefore is not worth worrying about either. (Incidentally, no proponent of libertarianism ever uses the term “counter causal”)
What is worth worrying about is broadly naturalistic libertarian free will. That is, a conception of free will that, unlike compatibilist has some defeasible requirements, such as indeterministic laws of physics, but only requirements which are logically and physically possible. The middle ground is where the action is. (Note that the magical notion of free will is often accused of needing some fundamental third alternative to determinism and chance, whereas naturalistic libertarian ism only requires a mixture of the two structure d in a certain way
Yep, no qualms there. it is definitely the pragmatic approach that works in the usual circumstances. The problem arise when you start exploring farther from the mainstream, where your intuition fails, like the Newcomb’s problem.
I don’t really understand the rest of your point. The libertarian free will “our choices are free from the determination or constraints of human nature and free from any predetermination by God” is pure magical thinking not grounded in science. There is no difference between determinism and chance in that sense, neither is top-down causation. Scott Aaronson suggested the Knightian free bit option as a source of true unpredictability, which seems to be an inherent requirement for the libertarian free will not based on magic. Being in a simulation is an old standby, of course.
In what way?
Perhaps I shoukd have bern clearer that complete determinism versus indeterminism is an open question in science . But then maybe you knew, because your you made a few references to indeterminism already. And maybe you knew because the issue is crucial to the the correct interpration of QM , which is discussed interminably here.
You hint very briefly at the he idea that randomness doesn’t support libertarian FW, but that is an open question in philosophy. It has been given book-length treatments.
Which? Is indeterminism incapable of supporting FW as stated in the first quote , or capable as in the second?
But that is slightly beside the point, since our are arguing against counterfactuals, and the existence of counterfactuals follows tatologously from the absence of strict determinism, questions of free will aside