In summary Newton should assign probability 0 to the statement that his theory of relativity is exactly correct. This turns out to be the right thing to do.
Huh? No. The probability shouldn’t be zero that he’s correct. Even now there’s some very tiny probability that Newton’s laws are exactly correct. This chance is vanishingly small but non-zero. Moreover, your argument implies too much because one could use the exact same logic for general relativity.
Ok. But even if you had a theory of quantum gravity that seemed to explain all observed data your argument would still go through. If your argument is accepted than any theory of everything would have to be assigned zero probability of being correct no matter how well it predicted things. This seems wrong.
“Should”? I would much rather be logically inconsistent, or bet that the axioms of probability are meaningless or irrelevant—which in relevant decision theoretic problems they tend to be—than give odds of infinity to one.
In summary Newton should assign probability 0 to the statement that his theory of relativity is exactly correct. This turns out to be the right thing to do.
Huh? No. The probability shouldn’t be zero that he’s correct. Even now there’s some very tiny probability that Newton’s laws are exactly correct. This chance is vanishingly small but non-zero. Moreover, your argument implies too much because one could use the exact same logic for general relativity.
And it would be equally correct.
Ok. But even if you had a theory of quantum gravity that seemed to explain all observed data your argument would still go through. If your argument is accepted than any theory of everything would have to be assigned zero probability of being correct no matter how well it predicted things. This seems wrong.
“Should”? I would much rather be logically inconsistent, or bet that the axioms of probability are meaningless or irrelevant—which in relevant decision theoretic problems they tend to be—than give odds of infinity to one.