There’s an unfortunate trick of naming here: some LWers use “utilitarian” to describe “valuing different outcomes by real numbers and acting to maximize expected value according to some decision theory”, and would thus describe a paperclip maximizer as utilitarian. I can easily accept that traditional Benthamite utilitarianism has no answer to the repugnant conclusion, though.
I mostly agree with this point, but the dust-speck/torture debate showed me that believing certain things about the additive properties of virtue/pleasure/suchlike commits me to choosing torture over dust specks. That is, unless your moral theory prohibits certain trade-offs, dust specks worse.
Further, utilitarian theories are all committed to believing the additive property. Is it unfair to say that any theory that believes the additive property (and is trying to maximize human virtue/pleasure/suchlike) is utilitarian?
Not all utilitarian theories are committed to believing the additive property—“average utilitarianism” most famously. Trying to maximize human “virtue” strikes me as quite a different thing than maximizing pleasure/utility and not something I would call utilitarianism. But in general yes, total, act utilitarianism is belief in maximizing additive property x where x is something like pleasure, desires, preferences etc.
There’s an unfortunate trick of naming here: some LWers use “utilitarian” to describe “valuing different outcomes by real numbers and acting to maximize expected value according to some decision theory”, and would thus describe a paperclip maximizer as utilitarian. I can easily accept that traditional Benthamite utilitarianism has no answer to the repugnant conclusion, though.
I mostly agree with this point, but the dust-speck/torture debate showed me that believing certain things about the additive properties of virtue/pleasure/suchlike commits me to choosing torture over dust specks. That is, unless your moral theory prohibits certain trade-offs, dust specks worse.
Further, utilitarian theories are all committed to believing the additive property. Is it unfair to say that any theory that believes the additive property (and is trying to maximize human virtue/pleasure/suchlike) is utilitarian?
Not all utilitarian theories are committed to believing the additive property—“average utilitarianism” most famously. Trying to maximize human “virtue” strikes me as quite a different thing than maximizing pleasure/utility and not something I would call utilitarianism. But in general yes, total, act utilitarianism is belief in maximizing additive property x where x is something like pleasure, desires, preferences etc.