Isn’t the measure of the set of me not in simulations (in a big world) equal to the probability that I’m not in a simulation (if there’s only one of me)?
only if you reason anthropically in calculating the “one of me” probability.
The point is that if there are some places in the multiverse with truly vast or even infinite amounts of computing power, then that will dominate the calculation in the case of thinking of yourself as the union of all your instances. So if that is to agree with the “one of me” case, then you’d better reason anthropically in that case, otherwise they’ll disagree.
Isn’t the measure of the set of me not in simulations (in a big world) equal to the probability that I’m not in a simulation (if there’s only one of me)?
only if you reason anthropically in calculating the “one of me” probability.
The point is that if there are some places in the multiverse with truly vast or even infinite amounts of computing power, then that will dominate the calculation in the case of thinking of yourself as the union of all your instances. So if that is to agree with the “one of me” case, then you’d better reason anthropically in that case, otherwise they’ll disagree.