Knowing that I’m in pain doesn’t require an additional and separate mental state about this pain that could be wrong.
Well, remember that illusion when you see a rubber hand, then some guy strikes it with a hammer and you recoil, perturbed and confused if you are in pain or not. Or sometimes you can notice that you are in pain, and in fact was in pain for some time, just not paid attention to it, but obvious as you look at your memory now.
I never did the rubber hand test, but recoiling from something doesn’t mean you believe you are in pain. (It doesn’t even necessarily mean you believe you have been injured, as you may recoil just from seeing something gross.) And the confusion from the rubber hand illusion presumably comes from something like a) believing that your hand has been physically injured and b) not feeling any pain. Which is inconsistent information, but it doesn’t show that you can be wrong about being in pain.
About (not) noticing pain: I think attention is a degree of consciousness, and that in this case you did pay some attention, just not complete attention. So you experienced the pain to a degree, and you knew the pain to the same degree. So this isn’t an example of being in pain without knowing it. Nor of falsely believing you’re not in pain.
There is a related case in which you may not be immediately able to verbalize something you know. But that doesn’t mean you didn’t know it, only that not all knowledge is propositional, and that knowing a propositional form isn’t necessary for knowing the what or how.
Feels like yet again the distinction of “starting from where we factor out everything else”. I’m more uncertain about that than most proponents of both camps.
Maybe at some point it makes sense to say that I’m confused about what I feel, what my qualia are? But you have the uhh intention to go deeper and say “oh, you are confused, so you feel confusion instead of whatever you are confused about, case closed”. KInda god of the gaps style.
Also might be that the most cases of feeling things are very apparent, so that weird examples are rare and weird. Most feelings are like 2 + 2 = 4, you would have trouble imagining being confused or wrong about it. When you can readily imagine being confused about 74389 + 37423 = 113812
Then illusionist says “I have no idea what are you talking about, yes, pain and redness I feel them, but what’s so interesting about that, metaphysically? they are just states of my brain, duh, nothing special”. And I think it’s kinda weird that I’m here and feeling things? like, it just feels weird that it’s a thing?
Well, remember that illusion when you see a rubber hand, then some guy strikes it with a hammer and you recoil, perturbed and confused if you are in pain or not. Or sometimes you can notice that you are in pain, and in fact was in pain for some time, just not paid attention to it, but obvious as you look at your memory now.
I think pain has a kinda “belief state” about it.
I never did the rubber hand test, but recoiling from something doesn’t mean you believe you are in pain. (It doesn’t even necessarily mean you believe you have been injured, as you may recoil just from seeing something gross.) And the confusion from the rubber hand illusion presumably comes from something like a) believing that your hand has been physically injured and b) not feeling any pain. Which is inconsistent information, but it doesn’t show that you can be wrong about being in pain.
About (not) noticing pain: I think attention is a degree of consciousness, and that in this case you did pay some attention, just not complete attention. So you experienced the pain to a degree, and you knew the pain to the same degree. So this isn’t an example of being in pain without knowing it. Nor of falsely believing you’re not in pain.
There is a related case in which you may not be immediately able to verbalize something you know. But that doesn’t mean you didn’t know it, only that not all knowledge is propositional, and that knowing a propositional form isn’t necessary for knowing the what or how.
Feels like yet again the distinction of “starting from where we factor out everything else”. I’m more uncertain about that than most proponents of both camps.
Maybe at some point it makes sense to say that I’m confused about what I feel, what my qualia are? But you have the uhh intention to go deeper and say “oh, you are confused, so you feel confusion instead of whatever you are confused about, case closed”. KInda god of the gaps style.
Also might be that the most cases of feeling things are very apparent, so that weird examples are rare and weird. Most feelings are like 2 + 2 = 4, you would have trouble imagining being confused or wrong about it. When you can readily imagine being confused about 74389 + 37423 = 113812
Then illusionist says “I have no idea what are you talking about, yes, pain and redness I feel them, but what’s so interesting about that, metaphysically? they are just states of my brain, duh, nothing special”. And I think it’s kinda weird that I’m here and feeling things? like, it just feels weird that it’s a thing?
idk.