I’d further specify that the bottom levels should not be fundamentally mental (or living). In other words, the bottom levels should resemble bowling balls or water more than it resembles fish or human beings; to look at it another way, we should end up explaining how human-like things are made out of water-like things since all is water, rather than how water-like things are made out of human-like things since all is mind.
This ‘specification’ seems quite vague and unhelpful. It should be noted that the bottom level could have some mind-like quality without actually being fundamentally mental itself—for instance, a panprotoexperiential reality is one where all entities share some precursors of qualia, but need not have any subjective experience or cognition.
Surely something like Occam’s razor comes in here. If we can explain consciousness in terms of our current science then why would we try to change our current science to include a mind-like quality as a fundamental property of matter? Make not sense to me.
If we can explain consciousness in terms of our current science
First of all, panexperientialism and its variations seek to explain subjective experience, not consciousness. Moreover, we in fact can’t explain consciousness. “Consciousness is an emergent property” is hardly a satisfactory explanation.
I’d further specify that the bottom levels should not be fundamentally mental (or living). In other words, the bottom levels should resemble bowling balls or water more than it resembles fish or human beings; to look at it another way, we should end up explaining how human-like things are made out of water-like things since all is water, rather than how water-like things are made out of human-like things since all is mind.
This ‘specification’ seems quite vague and unhelpful. It should be noted that the bottom level could have some mind-like quality without actually being fundamentally mental itself—for instance, a panprotoexperiential reality is one where all entities share some precursors of qualia, but need not have any subjective experience or cognition.
Surely something like Occam’s razor comes in here. If we can explain consciousness in terms of our current science then why would we try to change our current science to include a mind-like quality as a fundamental property of matter? Make not sense to me.
First of all, panexperientialism and its variations seek to explain subjective experience, not consciousness. Moreover, we in fact can’t explain consciousness. “Consciousness is an emergent property” is hardly a satisfactory explanation.
Do you have a specific comment or series of comments in mind, here?