This ‘specification’ seems quite vague and unhelpful. It should be noted that the bottom level could have some mind-like quality without actually being fundamentally mental itself—for instance, a panprotoexperiential reality is one where all entities share some precursors of qualia, but need not have any subjective experience or cognition.
Surely something like Occam’s razor comes in here. If we can explain consciousness in terms of our current science then why would we try to change our current science to include a mind-like quality as a fundamental property of matter? Make not sense to me.
If we can explain consciousness in terms of our current science
First of all, panexperientialism and its variations seek to explain subjective experience, not consciousness. Moreover, we in fact can’t explain consciousness. “Consciousness is an emergent property” is hardly a satisfactory explanation.
This ‘specification’ seems quite vague and unhelpful. It should be noted that the bottom level could have some mind-like quality without actually being fundamentally mental itself—for instance, a panprotoexperiential reality is one where all entities share some precursors of qualia, but need not have any subjective experience or cognition.
Surely something like Occam’s razor comes in here. If we can explain consciousness in terms of our current science then why would we try to change our current science to include a mind-like quality as a fundamental property of matter? Make not sense to me.
First of all, panexperientialism and its variations seek to explain subjective experience, not consciousness. Moreover, we in fact can’t explain consciousness. “Consciousness is an emergent property” is hardly a satisfactory explanation.
Do you have a specific comment or series of comments in mind, here?