I think Frankish is squirming a bit here, and that he should bite the relevant bullets more forthrightly (though to his credit, he’s still reasonably up front). No one ever thought that phenomenal zombies lacked introspective access to their own mental states, since they were by hypothesis functionally identical to humans; and the central function of “what it’s like” talk in the discourse about consciousness has been to point to/characterize phenomenal consciousness.
As an illusionist, I endorse biting this bullet. I think I just am a p-zombie.
I also endorse the rest of your post!
Because this account is more of a promissory note than a developed theory, it doesn’t provide a ton of content to aid in constructing an illusionist model of how your mind works.
Notably, the dualist sort of agrees that a story like this must be possible, since they think it’s possible to fully reductively explain p-zombies, who dualists agree do have delusive beliefs and perceptions exactly like those. (Or p-beliefs and p-perceptions, if you prefer.)
An important question here, perhaps, is whether the process of fully reductively explaining the p-zombie would help make illusionism feel less mysterious or counter-intuitive. (I have to imagine it would, even if there would always be an element of mind-bending oddness to the claim.)
I’m hopeful that if we actually had a worked out reductionist account of all the problematic intuitions, which we knew was right and which made illusionism true, then this would be at least somewhat helpful in making illusionism less mysterious. In particular, I’m hopeful that thoroughly and dutifully reconceptualizing our introspection and intuitions according to that theory — “when it seems to me like X, what’s going on is [insert actual gears level explanation, not just ‘neurons are firing’ or ‘my brain is representing its internal processing in a simplified and false way’]” — would make a difference.
As an illusionist, I endorse biting this bullet. I think I just am a p-zombie.
I also endorse the rest of your post!
Notably, the dualist sort of agrees that a story like this must be possible, since they think it’s possible to fully reductively explain p-zombies, who dualists agree do have delusive beliefs and perceptions exactly like those. (Or p-beliefs and p-perceptions, if you prefer.)
An important question here, perhaps, is whether the process of fully reductively explaining the p-zombie would help make illusionism feel less mysterious or counter-intuitive. (I have to imagine it would, even if there would always be an element of mind-bending oddness to the claim.)
I’m hopeful that if we actually had a worked out reductionist account of all the problematic intuitions, which we knew was right and which made illusionism true, then this would be at least somewhat helpful in making illusionism less mysterious. In particular, I’m hopeful that thoroughly and dutifully reconceptualizing our introspection and intuitions according to that theory — “when it seems to me like X, what’s going on is [insert actual gears level explanation, not just ‘neurons are firing’ or ‘my brain is representing its internal processing in a simplified and false way’]” — would make a difference.