This is quite abstract and cites difficult to access sources, so I can’t easily engage with it. It looks to me like it is citing people applying Standpoint Epistemology as if those applications were the arguments for Standpoint Epistemology.
However I notice it is on a website by James Lindsay. Overall I don’t have a good impression of James Lindsay, as he often seems to be misrepresenting things when I dig deeper. For instance part of what spurred this post was the various arguments my interlocutor gave for Standpoint Epistemology being bad, and among those arguments were James Lindsay’s book, Critical Theories. This is one of the main things I was referring to when I wrote:
the resources that criticized it seemed to me to either be misrepresenting what Standpoint Epistemologists were saying
It was also hard to find great examples in the Critical Theories book, since he kept things fairly abstract. However one of the concrete ‘problems’ I found Lindsay to point to was this:
The problem is that as far as I can tell, the 2014 paper “Tracking Epistemic Oppression” does not exist, and he was mixing together a 2014 paper titled “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression” with a 2011 paper titled “Tracking Epistemic Violence”. Based on his description of the paper, it is likely that his critique is directed towards the former paper.
The paper in question isn’t great—it’s convoluted and poorly written, and it seems to use a strained Plato’s Cave metaphor in order to avoid spicy political examples. However, while the paper is pretty bad, it’s not bad in the way Lindsay is describing it.
For instance Lindsay claims that Dotson claims that schemata have been specifically set up to work for dominant groups and exclude others, but really the way Dotson characterizes schemata is:
Organizational schemata, as I understand it, are a shared epistemic resource like language that enables goals and pursuits to be shared collectively.
The problems she describes in terms of including oppressed people’s experiences into the shared epistemic resources are mainly problems of trust rather than the knowledge deliberately being organized around excluding others.
For now I’m just going to post this: https://newdiscourses.com/tftw-standpoint-epistemology/
This is quite abstract and cites difficult to access sources, so I can’t easily engage with it. It looks to me like it is citing people applying Standpoint Epistemology as if those applications were the arguments for Standpoint Epistemology.
However I notice it is on a website by James Lindsay. Overall I don’t have a good impression of James Lindsay, as he often seems to be misrepresenting things when I dig deeper. For instance part of what spurred this post was the various arguments my interlocutor gave for Standpoint Epistemology being bad, and among those arguments were James Lindsay’s book, Critical Theories. This is one of the main things I was referring to when I wrote:
It was also hard to find great examples in the Critical Theories book, since he kept things fairly abstract. However one of the concrete ‘problems’ I found Lindsay to point to was this:
The problem is that as far as I can tell, the 2014 paper “Tracking Epistemic Oppression” does not exist, and he was mixing together a 2014 paper titled “Conceptualizing Epistemic Oppression” with a 2011 paper titled “Tracking Epistemic Violence”. Based on his description of the paper, it is likely that his critique is directed towards the former paper.
The paper in question isn’t great—it’s convoluted and poorly written, and it seems to use a strained Plato’s Cave metaphor in order to avoid spicy political examples. However, while the paper is pretty bad, it’s not bad in the way Lindsay is describing it.
For instance Lindsay claims that Dotson claims that schemata have been specifically set up to work for dominant groups and exclude others, but really the way Dotson characterizes schemata is:
This schemata concept is really similar to the popular LessWrong post of Shared Frames Are Capital Investments in Coordination.
The problems she describes in terms of including oppressed people’s experiences into the shared epistemic resources are mainly problems of trust rather than the knowledge deliberately being organized around excluding others.