Your comment can be interpreted as a statement that theories of identity are meaningless. If they are meaningless, then copy=original view prevails. From the third-person point of view, there is no difference between copy and original. In that case, there is no need to perform the experiment.
There is a full explanation right there, in the description of the thought experiment. It describes all outcomes, including all observations and theoretical conclusions made by all the people-instances. We can look at this and ask whether those theoretical conclusions are correct, whether the theories the people-instances use to arrive at them are valid. You can tell what all the details of outcomes are in advance of actually doing this.
Personal experimence of people existing in the world is mediated by the physical states of their brains (or other physical hardware). So we can in principle predict what it says by asking about the physical content of the world. There are agents/people that don’t have concrete instances in the world, and we can ask what they experience. They might leave the physical world, or enter it back, getting instantiated once more or for the first time. They might persistently exist outside concrete instantiation in the world, only communicating with it through reasoning about their behavior, which might be a more resource efficient way to implement a person than a mere concrete upload. But that’s a different setting, not what this post describes.
They might persistently exist outside concrete instantiation in the world, only communicating with it through reasoning about their behavior, which might be a more resource efficient way to implement a person than a mere concrete upload
Your comment can be interpreted as a statement that theories of identity are meaningless. If they are meaningless, then copy=original view prevails. From the third-person point of view, there is no difference between copy and original. In that case, there is no need to perform the experiment.
There is a full explanation right there, in the description of the thought experiment. It describes all outcomes, including all observations and theoretical conclusions made by all the people-instances. We can look at this and ask whether those theoretical conclusions are correct, whether the theories the people-instances use to arrive at them are valid. You can tell what all the details of outcomes are in advance of actually doing this.
Personal experimence of people existing in the world is mediated by the physical states of their brains (or other physical hardware). So we can in principle predict what it says by asking about the physical content of the world. There are agents/people that don’t have concrete instances in the world, and we can ask what they experience. They might leave the physical world, or enter it back, getting instantiated once more or for the first time. They might persistently exist outside concrete instantiation in the world, only communicating with it through reasoning about their behavior, which might be a more resource efficient way to implement a person than a mere concrete upload. But that’s a different setting, not what this post describes.
Interesting. Can you elaborate?