Schelling points are not values. At best, the concept is useful only for figuring out how to mediate conflicting values.
Chesterton’s Fence is a valuable argument, but repeating citing it to me is a barely veiled accusation that I haven’t thought things through (and if Chesterton’s Fence isn’t what your second link is intended to argue, then I am simply confused).
I’m opening to addressing specific problems that you identify, but you haven’t actually identified any problems with talking about what the social expectations already are.
Moreover, the particular moral positions I’m asserting (e.g. non-consensual touching is not generally allowed in a functioning society have been supported by the overwhelming majority of moral thinkers for longer than you and I have been alive. We might suspect those thinkers were insincere, but it is no defense to say “Don’t listen to me, I was being a hypocrite.”
Chesterton’s Fence is a valuable argument, but repeating citing it to me is a barely veiled accusation that I haven’t thought things through (and if Chesterton’s Fence isn’t what your second link is intended to argue, then I am simply confused).
Moreover, the particular moral positions I’m asserting (e.g. non-consensual touching is not generally allowed in a functioning society have been supported by the overwhelming majority of moral thinkers for longer than you and I have been alive.
I suppose this is technically true for certain values of “non-consensual”, specifically you have to assume there is a presumption of implicit consent to certain types of touching in many situations. In some cases this definition is extremely stretched. In any case there is a lot of room to slip one way or the other on what kind of touching one is presumed to have consented to.
Schelling points are not values. At best, the concept is useful only for figuring out how to mediate conflicting values.
Chesterton’s Fence is a valuable argument, but repeating citing it to me is a barely veiled accusation that I haven’t thought things through (and if Chesterton’s Fence isn’t what your second link is intended to argue, then I am simply confused).
I’m opening to addressing specific problems that you identify, but you haven’t actually identified any problems with talking about what the social expectations already are.
Moreover, the particular moral positions I’m asserting (e.g. non-consensual touching is not generally allowed in a functioning society have been supported by the overwhelming majority of moral thinkers for longer than you and I have been alive. We might suspect those thinkers were insincere, but it is no defense to say “Don’t listen to me, I was being a hypocrite.”
See my edit.
I suppose this is technically true for certain values of “non-consensual”, specifically you have to assume there is a presumption of implicit consent to certain types of touching in many situations. In some cases this definition is extremely stretched. In any case there is a lot of room to slip one way or the other on what kind of touching one is presumed to have consented to.