I’ll admit that I don’t think I understand ethical nihilists
I don’t know if I qualify or not. I don’t like nor agree with object-level morality of many who call themselves “nihilist”, but I’m definitely an anti-realist in that I don’t think there’s an objective or observable “truth” to be had on ethical issues (or meta-ethical issues). I’m with you on disregarding Martha’s question, and I think the problem of “what is true” goes as deep as you like in meta-meta-meta-etc. ethics. “if nihilism is true...” is not a valid start to a proposition. It’s NOT true, nor is it false. It’s a different dimension than truth.
But there are still pretty strong “should” statements to be made. They’re based on common preferences and observations of working equilibria, not directly testable. There IS truth in expressed and observed preferences and interactions among moral actors in various contexts (modern societies and subcultures). It is actually the case that some equilibria seem to work OK, and some seem less so, and it’s very reasonable to have pro-social preferences about one’s own and others’ behavior.
My “should” comes from observations and extensions of what things seem to make for a more pleasant/attractive world. Everyone SHOULD avoid burning people, even for a lot of money. I like the world where that’s the common choice much better than the world where it isn’t. Doesn’t make it “true”, and I can imagine contexts where there would be different common preferences and equilibria.
I don’t know if I qualify or not. I don’t like nor agree with object-level morality of many who call themselves “nihilist”, but I’m definitely an anti-realist in that I don’t think there’s an objective or observable “truth” to be had on ethical issues (or meta-ethical issues). I’m with you on disregarding Martha’s question, and I think the problem of “what is true” goes as deep as you like in meta-meta-meta-etc. ethics. “if nihilism is true...” is not a valid start to a proposition. It’s NOT true, nor is it false. It’s a different dimension than truth.
But there are still pretty strong “should” statements to be made. They’re based on common preferences and observations of working equilibria, not directly testable. There IS truth in expressed and observed preferences and interactions among moral actors in various contexts (modern societies and subcultures). It is actually the case that some equilibria seem to work OK, and some seem less so, and it’s very reasonable to have pro-social preferences about one’s own and others’ behavior.
My “should” comes from observations and extensions of what things seem to make for a more pleasant/attractive world. Everyone SHOULD avoid burning people, even for a lot of money. I like the world where that’s the common choice much better than the world where it isn’t. Doesn’t make it “true”, and I can imagine contexts where there would be different common preferences and equilibria.