I consider myself to be someone who’s politically non-ideological,
I think the problem is that being “politically non-ideological” is a meaningless phrase. Rather, if someone describes himself as “non-ideological” that generally means he’s bought into his ideology so strongly that he no longer perceives it as an ideology.
Do you feel angry, defensive, threatened, annoyed, or aggressive when you think about politics? Then you might be an ideologue. Do you feel curious, compassionate, thoughtful, surprised, or playful when you think about politics? Then you might not be an ideologue. Personally, my intuition is that a conversation in most any domain, politics included, with a curious thoughtful person is likely to be much more productive than a conversation with an angry, defensive one (where productivity is defined as learning what the truth is).
Rather, if someone describes himself as “non-ideological” that generally means he’s bought into his ideology so strongly that he no longer perceives it as an ideology.
I know nothing about Australian politics. Am I allowed to refer to myself as non-ideological when it comes to Australian politics? Or do I have an ideology regarding Australian politics that’s so strong that I don’t even perceive it as an ideology? ;) [winky face is supposed to put you in a curious, playful mindset ;)]
To take my point even further: do I have an ideology regarding the best way to use a bucket full of Legos? What is it about politics that causes everyone to have an ideology a priori? It sounds as though you think that thinking about politics the same way I think about the best way to use a bucket of Legos is somehow ruled out by definition. Would you say that’s an accurate summary of your position?
Sure… and as soon as you’ve made that transition to seeing politics in terms of conflict, then you’ve become more of an ideologue, according to how I’ve been using the term. So ideally you want yourself and others to make that transition as late as possible (or not at all) because once you get in that state, your rationality is impaired, defection spirals are possible, and finding mutual wins becomes more difficult.
It seems to me that many political arguments are not about values, e.g. people both for and against nuclear power will typically argue that their way of doing things will be better for the environment. My guess is that nuclear power debates would be more productive if participants did not see things in terms of conflict. Do you disagree?
Elsewhere in this thread you say that politics brings out the worst in you rationality-wise. It doesn’t sound like you agree with my proposed explanation for why this might be happening. I’d be quite curious to hear yours.
It seems to me that many political arguments are not about values
Political conflict comes from conflicts over facts and values. Facts are relatively easy to establish. Values simply conflict.
people both for and against nuclear power will typically argue that their way of doing things will be better for the environment.
Where “better” drops the context of “better according to my values”, so that better to me is not better to you. Better is a value judgment, and our values are not identical.
People are hopeless to talk politics with until they grok this.
The first thing to do in any honest negotiation is to mutually communicate your values.
Elsewhere in this thread you say that politics brings out the worst in you rationality-wise.
People tend to think poorly when something is on the line, in conflict with what others have on the line. But there is a conceptual difficulty prior to that, where they mistake their preferences for facts of the universe, equally applicable to all.
It’s difficult to be rational when you’re in conflict with others about significant values. It’s next to impossible if your fundamental concepts structurally commit you to error about the reality of the conflict.
Political conflict comes from conflicts over facts and values. Facts are relatively easy to establish. Values simply conflict.
Not only that—there are also models (which, for the purposes of this thread, we can define as maps that produce forecasts).
To reuse the example in the grandfather post, Alice and Bob arguing about nuclear power could have exactly the same values and agree about the facts. However Alice has a model which forecasts that in a hundred years nuclear power leads to radioactive deserts and Bob has a model which forecasts that in a hundred years nuclear power leads to nothing but some safely hidden away containers with radioactive waste.
Alice and Bob differ in their expectations of the future—that’s neither facts nor values.
(Yes, I’m familiar with the Aumann’s Theorem, but it just doesn’t work in reality)
where they mistake their preferences for facts of the universe
Yes, I agree it’s really hard to talk to people who don’t realize this.
Tell that to a scientist (one who establishes facts as a profession).
Where “better” drops the context of “better according to my values”, so that better to me is not better to you. Better is a value judgment, and our values are not identical.
I disagree this is the case for folks who argue about nuclear power.
Yes, you do. I assume you’re at least aware that it’s a parliamentary constitutional monarchy with norms resembling those on other advanced western democracies.
Am I allowed to refer to myself as non-ideological when it comes to Australian politics?
You have an ideology about how governments ought to work, you may not know enough about Australia to know what its doing wrong or which party is closest to pushing things in the wright direction, but if you did the research you’d either find yourself sympathizing with one of them or conclude that all of them are insane and advocate some radical (from the point of view of internal Australian politics) position that hardly anyone there is advocating.
Let’s replace Australia with something like Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Belarus, or Kazakhstan. I’m guessing you probably know about as little about at least one of those countries as you know about Australia and yet you probably have opinions about what’s wrong with those countries.
To take my point even further: do I have an ideology regarding the best way to use a bucket full of Legos?
You have priors and preconceptions about it.
What is it about politics that causes everyone to have an ideology a priori?
Because the word “ideology” is generally used to refer specifically to politics.
I am not sure “truth” or match to reality is a useful metric to apply to ideologies. Ideologies are mostly normative and prescriptive. Their two basic ways of failure are (1) produce a system which is unlike what the ideology wanted and/or expected; and (2) produce a system which you find unacceptable because of a major mismatch with your values.
Ideologies frequently make falsifiable statements. They tend to say X is true so one should do Y to produce good outcome Z. The statements “X is true”, and “doing Y produces outcome Z” are both falsifiable. Granted the statement “outcome Z is good” is harder to analyze given the current state of metaethics, but in practice one can get remarkably far just looking at the first two statements.
Ideologies frequently make falsifiable statements.
Ideologies rarely make easily falsifiable statements.
Karl Marx said that a proletarian revolution will lead to heaven on Earth. This is a falsifiable statement (and it was successfully falsified), but in order to falsify it you have to try it which is often all an ideology wants.
I think the problem is that being “politically non-ideological” is a meaningless phrase. Rather, if someone describes himself as “non-ideological” that generally means he’s bought into his ideology so strongly that he no longer perceives it as an ideology.
Or someone whose ideology isn’t one of the mainstream ones, and thus is rarely stated explicitly.
Do you feel angry, defensive, threatened, annoyed, or aggressive when you think about politics? Then you might be an ideologue. Do you feel curious, compassionate, thoughtful, surprised, or playful when you think about politics? Then you might not be an ideologue. Personally, my intuition is that a conversation in most any domain, politics included, with a curious thoughtful person is likely to be much more productive than a conversation with an angry, defensive one (where productivity is defined as learning what the truth is).
I know nothing about Australian politics. Am I allowed to refer to myself as non-ideological when it comes to Australian politics? Or do I have an ideology regarding Australian politics that’s so strong that I don’t even perceive it as an ideology? ;) [winky face is supposed to put you in a curious, playful mindset ;)]
To take my point even further: do I have an ideology regarding the best way to use a bucket full of Legos? What is it about politics that causes everyone to have an ideology a priori? It sounds as though you think that thinking about politics the same way I think about the best way to use a bucket of Legos is somehow ruled out by definition. Would you say that’s an accurate summary of your position?
Or, you might be someone who has values and recognizes that the political ideas of others harms those values.
Sure… and as soon as you’ve made that transition to seeing politics in terms of conflict, then you’ve become more of an ideologue, according to how I’ve been using the term. So ideally you want yourself and others to make that transition as late as possible (or not at all) because once you get in that state, your rationality is impaired, defection spirals are possible, and finding mutual wins becomes more difficult.
You’ve become more accurate in your assessment of the situation.
That’s not my ideal.
It seems to me that many political arguments are not about values, e.g. people both for and against nuclear power will typically argue that their way of doing things will be better for the environment. My guess is that nuclear power debates would be more productive if participants did not see things in terms of conflict. Do you disagree?
Elsewhere in this thread you say that politics brings out the worst in you rationality-wise. It doesn’t sound like you agree with my proposed explanation for why this might be happening. I’d be quite curious to hear yours.
Political conflict comes from conflicts over facts and values. Facts are relatively easy to establish. Values simply conflict.
Where “better” drops the context of “better according to my values”, so that better to me is not better to you. Better is a value judgment, and our values are not identical.
People are hopeless to talk politics with until they grok this.
The first thing to do in any honest negotiation is to mutually communicate your values.
People tend to think poorly when something is on the line, in conflict with what others have on the line. But there is a conceptual difficulty prior to that, where they mistake their preferences for facts of the universe, equally applicable to all.
It’s difficult to be rational when you’re in conflict with others about significant values. It’s next to impossible if your fundamental concepts structurally commit you to error about the reality of the conflict.
Not only that—there are also models (which, for the purposes of this thread, we can define as maps that produce forecasts).
To reuse the example in the grandfather post, Alice and Bob arguing about nuclear power could have exactly the same values and agree about the facts. However Alice has a model which forecasts that in a hundred years nuclear power leads to radioactive deserts and Bob has a model which forecasts that in a hundred years nuclear power leads to nothing but some safely hidden away containers with radioactive waste.
Alice and Bob differ in their expectations of the future—that’s neither facts nor values.
(Yes, I’m familiar with the Aumann’s Theorem, but it just doesn’t work in reality)
Yes, I agree it’s really hard to talk to people who don’t realize this.
Yeah, it’s probably worthwhile to separate out models and their predictions from facts.
Tell that to a scientist (one who establishes facts as a profession).
I disagree this is the case for folks who argue about nuclear power.
By “ideological”, do you mean “partisan”? If not, could you taboo “ideology”/”ideological”/”non-ideological”?
Yes, you do. I assume you’re at least aware that it’s a parliamentary constitutional monarchy with norms resembling those on other advanced western democracies.
You have an ideology about how governments ought to work, you may not know enough about Australia to know what its doing wrong or which party is closest to pushing things in the wright direction, but if you did the research you’d either find yourself sympathizing with one of them or conclude that all of them are insane and advocate some radical (from the point of view of internal Australian politics) position that hardly anyone there is advocating.
Let’s replace Australia with something like Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Belarus, or Kazakhstan. I’m guessing you probably know about as little about at least one of those countries as you know about Australia and yet you probably have opinions about what’s wrong with those countries.
You have priors and preconceptions about it.
Because the word “ideology” is generally used to refer specifically to politics.
Interesting! That’s a notion that I would generally associate with the postmodernist academic left.
The difference is I believe that some ideologies are truer, i.e., better correspond to reality, than others.
I am not sure “truth” or match to reality is a useful metric to apply to ideologies. Ideologies are mostly normative and prescriptive. Their two basic ways of failure are (1) produce a system which is unlike what the ideology wanted and/or expected; and (2) produce a system which you find unacceptable because of a major mismatch with your values.
Ideologies frequently make falsifiable statements. They tend to say X is true so one should do Y to produce good outcome Z. The statements “X is true”, and “doing Y produces outcome Z” are both falsifiable. Granted the statement “outcome Z is good” is harder to analyze given the current state of metaethics, but in practice one can get remarkably far just looking at the first two statements.
Ideologies rarely make easily falsifiable statements.
Karl Marx said that a proletarian revolution will lead to heaven on Earth. This is a falsifiable statement (and it was successfully falsified), but in order to falsify it you have to try it which is often all an ideology wants.
Agreed, my point is that it is still meaningful to speak about ideologies being right or wrong.
That’s not a difference.