If you accept that the existence of mathematical truths beyond physical truths cannot have any predictive power, then how do you reconcile that with this previous statement of yours:
Presupposing things without evidence
As you can see, I am not doing that.
I will say again that I don’t reject any mathematics. Even ‘useless’ mathematics is encoded inside physical human brains.
If you accept that the existence of mathematical truths beyond physical truths cannot have any predictive power,
If they did have predictive power, they would be physical truths.
I will say again that I don’t reject any mathematics. Even ‘useless’ mathematics is encoded inside physical human brains.
And wrong mathematics, and stuff that isn’t mathematics at all. The observation you keep making doesn’t explain anything … it doesn’t tell you what maths is, and it doesn’t telly you what makes true maths true … so it’s not an explanatory reduction … so it’s not a reduction at all, as most people use the term.
If you accept that the existence of mathematical truths beyond physical truths cannot have any predictive power, then how do you reconcile that with this previous statement of yours:
I will say again that I don’t reject any mathematics. Even ‘useless’ mathematics is encoded inside physical human brains.
If they did have predictive power, they would be physical truths.
And wrong mathematics, and stuff that isn’t mathematics at all. The observation you keep making doesn’t explain anything … it doesn’t tell you what maths is, and it doesn’t telly you what makes true maths true … so it’s not an explanatory reduction … so it’s not a reduction at all, as most people use the term.