This is getting tiresome. The link you just gave was actually to a time when I was summarizing my previous attempt to correct a further previous misunderstanding of my position.
You haven’t actually addressed any of it, including here. I gave a specific example of this model of qualia in a different context: generated symbols in programing. Instead of just an inflammatory strawman plus a non-sequitur,
you are saying that the experience of color is the experience of colorlessness, plus a color label. Which is the same as saying that I don’t actually see color, I just think I see color.
how about you actually say where you think that model breaks down?
How about you stop repeating the same confusion between the linguistic label and the computational label, like you’re doing here:
And I presume that the “blue data” is called blue, … because that’s the name we’re using for a particular range of data values.
Again (this is at least the third time I’ve explained this to you): the phenomenal experience of blue is not the same thing as the name “blue”. You experience seeing blue whether or not you have the term “blue” (or “azul” or “blau” or “bleu” or “aoi”). Rather, the phenomenal experience of blue is what it is like to be a program that has classified incoming data as being a certain kind of light, under the constraint of having to coherently represent all of its other data (other colors, other visual qualities, other senses, other combined extrapolations from multiple senses, etc) but with limited comparison abilities.
Yes, as part of your use of a language, you can assign the label “blue”. But that’s not how I’m explaining phenomenal blue. I’m explaining phenomenal blue as your architecture’s direct label for a kind of light, below the level at which you can see it work. To experience blue is to feel your cognitive architecture assigning a label to sensory data.
Now, you may have a reason to reject this approach. You may have reason to believe that the associated research program will turn out surprisingly fruitless. You may have an alternative which looks more promising.
But I have no way of knowing that, when the only response that you give to the reasoning that I’ve just given (and have given in some form or another five times now) is to ignore it or respond to a mischaracterization of it.
Now, try again, and this time, communicate to me what caused you to reject this approach at the time you considered it during the last eight years. I would love to know what you uncovered in trying this out.
This is getting tiresome. The link you just gave was actually to a time when I was summarizing my previous attempt to correct a further previous misunderstanding of my position.
You haven’t actually addressed any of it, including here. I gave a specific example of this model of qualia in a different context: generated symbols in programing. Instead of just an inflammatory strawman plus a non-sequitur,
how about you actually say where you think that model breaks down?
How about you stop repeating the same confusion between the linguistic label and the computational label, like you’re doing here:
Again (this is at least the third time I’ve explained this to you): the phenomenal experience of blue is not the same thing as the name “blue”. You experience seeing blue whether or not you have the term “blue” (or “azul” or “blau” or “bleu” or “aoi”). Rather, the phenomenal experience of blue is what it is like to be a program that has classified incoming data as being a certain kind of light, under the constraint of having to coherently represent all of its other data (other colors, other visual qualities, other senses, other combined extrapolations from multiple senses, etc) but with limited comparison abilities.
Yes, as part of your use of a language, you can assign the label “blue”. But that’s not how I’m explaining phenomenal blue. I’m explaining phenomenal blue as your architecture’s direct label for a kind of light, below the level at which you can see it work. To experience blue is to feel your cognitive architecture assigning a label to sensory data.
Now, you may have a reason to reject this approach. You may have reason to believe that the associated research program will turn out surprisingly fruitless. You may have an alternative which looks more promising.
But I have no way of knowing that, when the only response that you give to the reasoning that I’ve just given (and have given in some form or another five times now) is to ignore it or respond to a mischaracterization of it.
Now, try again, and this time, communicate to me what caused you to reject this approach at the time you considered it during the last eight years. I would love to know what you uncovered in trying this out.
I have aggregated my latest responses here.