Thanks for the detailed comment! I’ll split my reply up by rough subtopics, in hopes that that makes things easier to follow and engage with.
On harms from true information
You write:
It’s interesting how it relates to false information. A failed implementation of ‘true’ nuclear reactor blue prints could also be dangerous (depending on the design).* Some designs could have more risk than others based on how likely people handling it are to fail at making a safe reactor. (Dangerous Wooden Catapult—Plans not safe for children.)
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This one may make more sense absent the true criteria—telling true from false need not be trivial. (How would people who aren’t nuclear specialists tell that a design for a nuke is flawed?) The difference between true and false w.r.t possibly self-fulfilling prophecies isn’t clear.\
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Also could be a risk in reverse—hiding evidence of a catastrophe could hinder its prevention/counter measures being developed (in time).
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“The concept of information hazards relates to risks of harm from creating or spreading true information (not from creating or spreading false information).”
By definition only—the hazards of information need not obey this constraint.
Bostrom writes:
This paper will also not discuss the ways in which harm can be caused by false information. Many of those ways are obvious. We can be harmed, for instance, by false information that misleads us into believing that some carcinogenic pharmaceutical is safe; or, alternatively, that some safe pharmaceutical is carcinogenic. We will limit our investigation to the ways in which the discovery and dissemination of true information can be harmful.
Likewise, I think it’s definitely and clearly true that false information (which perhaps shouldn’t be called information at all, but rather misinformation, falsehoods, mistaken ideas, etc.) can and often does cause harm. I expect that mirrors of all or most of Bostrom’s types of information hazards could be created for misinformation specifically. But Bostrom’s aim was to emphasise the less obvious and often overlooked claim that even true information can sometimes cause harm (not that especially or only true information can cause harm).
Also, yes, in a sense “The concept of information hazards relates to risks of harm from creating or spreading true information (not from creating or spreading false information)” is true only by definition, because that sentence is a definition. But concepts and definitions are useful—they aid in communication, and in gaining mutual understanding of what subset of all the myriad possible things and ideas one is referring to.
It’s true that misinformation can cause harm, but that’s widely noted, so it’s useful to also have a term to highlight that true information can cause harm to, and that we use when we’re referring that narrow subset of all possibilities.
(This is why I wrote “He emphasises that this concept is just about how true information can cause harm, not how false information can cause harm (which is typically a more obvious possibility)” [emphasis swapped].)
Thanks for the detailed comment! I’ll split my reply up by rough subtopics, in hopes that that makes things easier to follow and engage with.
On harms from true information
You write:
Bostrom writes:
Likewise, I think it’s definitely and clearly true that false information (which perhaps shouldn’t be called information at all, but rather misinformation, falsehoods, mistaken ideas, etc.) can and often does cause harm. I expect that mirrors of all or most of Bostrom’s types of information hazards could be created for misinformation specifically. But Bostrom’s aim was to emphasise the less obvious and often overlooked claim that even true information can sometimes cause harm (not that especially or only true information can cause harm).
Also, yes, in a sense “The concept of information hazards relates to risks of harm from creating or spreading true information (not from creating or spreading false information)” is true only by definition, because that sentence is a definition. But concepts and definitions are useful—they aid in communication, and in gaining mutual understanding of what subset of all the myriad possible things and ideas one is referring to.
It’s true that misinformation can cause harm, but that’s widely noted, so it’s useful to also have a term to highlight that true information can cause harm to, and that we use when we’re referring that narrow subset of all possibilities.
(This is why I wrote “He emphasises that this concept is just about how true information can cause harm, not how false information can cause harm (which is typically a more obvious possibility)” [emphasis swapped].)