The value of saved vs. new vs. cloned lives is a worthwhile question (and yes, it’s only one example) - to introspect on.
I’d gain more satisfaction out of saving a group of people by defeating the cause directly—safely killing or capturing the kidnappers rather than paying the ransom. I’d rather save all those at risk by defeating the entire threat, permanently. If I can only save a small fraction of the group threatened by a single cause, that’s less satisfying. But maybe in what you’d think would be a nearly-linear region (you can save a few people from starvation today, for sure), I’d be more than half as satisfied by helping one identifiable person and being able to monitor the consequences than I would by helping two (out of an ocean of a billion). Further, in those “drop in a bucket” cases, I’d expect some desire to save people from diverse threats, as long as the reduced efficiency wasn’t too high to justify the thrill of novelty. This desire would be in tension with conserving research/decision effort (just save one more life in the way already researched, prepared, and tested), consistency, a desire for complete victory (but I postulated that my maximal impact was too small—but becoming part of an alliance that achieves complete victory would be nice).
Part of the value of saving existing lives is that I feel a sense of security knowing that I and people like me are fighting such threats as might someday affect me—a reflexive feeling of having allies in the world who might help me—not as a result of anonymous charity (which would be irrational), but as a result of my being the type of person who, when having resources to spare, helps where it’s needed more.
But I’m convinced by mathematical arguments that utility should be additive. If the value of N things in the real world is not N times the value of 1 thing, then I handle that in how I assign utility to world states. I want to use additive utility, and as far as I can tell I’m immune to arguments about nonlinearity of objects.
I’m convinced by mathematical arguments that utility should be additive. If the value of N things in the real world is not N times the value of 1 thing, then I handle that in how I assign utility to world states.
I don’t disagree. My choice of slogan wording—“utility is not additive”—doesn’t capture what I mean. I meant only to deny that the value of something happening N times is (N x U) where U is the value of it happening once.
The value of saved vs. new vs. cloned lives is a worthwhile question (and yes, it’s only one example) - to introspect on.
I’d gain more satisfaction out of saving a group of people by defeating the cause directly—safely killing or capturing the kidnappers rather than paying the ransom. I’d rather save all those at risk by defeating the entire threat, permanently. If I can only save a small fraction of the group threatened by a single cause, that’s less satisfying. But maybe in what you’d think would be a nearly-linear region (you can save a few people from starvation today, for sure), I’d be more than half as satisfied by helping one identifiable person and being able to monitor the consequences than I would by helping two (out of an ocean of a billion). Further, in those “drop in a bucket” cases, I’d expect some desire to save people from diverse threats, as long as the reduced efficiency wasn’t too high to justify the thrill of novelty. This desire would be in tension with conserving research/decision effort (just save one more life in the way already researched, prepared, and tested), consistency, a desire for complete victory (but I postulated that my maximal impact was too small—but becoming part of an alliance that achieves complete victory would be nice).
Part of the value of saving existing lives is that I feel a sense of security knowing that I and people like me are fighting such threats as might someday affect me—a reflexive feeling of having allies in the world who might help me—not as a result of anonymous charity (which would be irrational), but as a result of my being the type of person who, when having resources to spare, helps where it’s needed more.
But I’m convinced by mathematical arguments that utility should be additive. If the value of N things in the real world is not N times the value of 1 thing, then I handle that in how I assign utility to world states. I want to use additive utility, and as far as I can tell I’m immune to arguments about nonlinearity of objects.
I don’t disagree. My choice of slogan wording—“utility is not additive”—doesn’t capture what I mean. I meant only to deny that the value of something happening N times is (N x U) where U is the value of it happening once.