I often complain about this type of reasoning too, but perhaps there is a steelman version of it.
For example, suppose the lock on my front door is broken, and I hear a rumour that a neighbour has been sneaking into my house at night. It turns out the rumour is false, but I might reasonably think, “The fact that this is so plausible is a wake-up call. I really need to change that lock!”
Generalising this: a plausible-but-false rumour can fail to provide empirical evidence for something, but still provide ‘logical evidence’ by alerting you to something that is already plausible in your model but that you hadn’t specifically thought about. Ideal Bayesian reasoners don’t need to be alerted to what they already fiind plausible, but humans sometimes do.
I often complain about this type of reasoning too, but perhaps there is a steelman version of it.
For example, suppose the lock on my front door is broken, and I hear a rumour that a neighbour has been sneaking into my house at night. It turns out the rumour is false, but I might reasonably think, “The fact that this is so plausible is a wake-up call. I really need to change that lock!”
Generalising this: a plausible-but-false rumour can fail to provide empirical evidence for something, but still provide ‘logical evidence’ by alerting you to something that is already plausible in your model but that you hadn’t specifically thought about. Ideal Bayesian reasoners don’t need to be alerted to what they already fiind plausible, but humans sometimes do.